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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
  
 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
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 A. Factual History 
 This is an appeal from judgments of conviction and 
sentence entered following a jury trial in the United States 
District Court for the District of Delaware.0  The appellants are 
John Patrick Dowd, who was convicted of knowingly making a false 
declaration under oath, 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a), and William P. 
Reilly, who was convicted of knowingly making false declarations 
under oath, 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a), and of transporting incinerator 
ash from the United States for the purpose of dumping it into the 
ocean, 33 U.S.C. § 1411(a).  The charges against Dowd and Reilly 
arose from three sources: a Delaware indictment alleging that 
they knowingly made false material declarations before a grand 
jury; a Delaware information charging Reilly with the dumping 
violation; and a Pennsylvania indictment alleging that Reilly 
knowingly made false material declarations before a district 
court during a contempt hearing.  The Pennsylvania indictment was 
transferred to the District of Delaware for consolidation and 
trial.  The district court had subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).    
 Dowd and Reilly were respectively the president and 
vice president of Coastal Carriers Corporation, which was based 
in Annapolis, Maryland.  Coastal Carriers acted as an agent for 
the Amalgamated Shipping Corporation, a Bahamas corporation whose 
                     
0We refer to the appendices as follows:  (1) Dowd's appendix is 
D. app.; (2) Reilly's appendix is R. app.; (3) the government's 
appendix is U.S. app.  We refer to the briefs in a similar way. 
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president and vice-president, respectively, were Robert Cordes 
and Henry Dowd, John Patrick Dowd's father.  Cordes was also 
president of several other corporations including MASCO, Lily 
Navigation, and Romo Shipping Corporation.  In early 1986, John 
Patrick Dowd and Reilly entered into negotiations with Joseph 
Paolino & Sons, Inc., a contractor with the City of Philadelphia, 
leading to Paolino and Amalgamated signing a contract on June 23, 
1986, in which Amalgamated agreed to transport and dispose of 
incinerator ash residue produced by the city. 
 Subsequently, Amalgamated entered into a two-year time 
charter with Lily Navigation for one of Lily's ships, the Khian 
Sea.  In August 1986, Paolino loaded approximately 13,500 tons of 
incinerator ash into the holds of the Khian Sea, while the ship 
was docked at Girard Point in Philadelphia.  See U.S. app. at 
249-251.  Later that month, the Khian Sea left Philadelphia for 
the Bahamas where Amalgamated intended to dispose of the ash. 
However, before the Khian Sea reached the Bahamas, that country 
denied Amalgamated permission to dispose of the ash.  Apparently, 
the Khian Sea then sailed around the Caribbean for more than a 
year while a disposal site was sought. 
 In November 1987, Amalgamated had not yet found a site 
for the ash, and the ship was anchored in Puerto Cortes, 
Honduras.  At that point, the captain of the Khian Sea left the 
ship, and Reilly hired Arturo Fuentes, a captain who lived in 
Puerto Cortes, to replace him.  Reilly directed Fuentes to take 
the ship to Haiti, where the ash would be off-loaded.  After the 
Khian Sea arrived in Haiti, its crew began off-loading the ash 
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but the Haitian military authorities interrupted the operation 
and required the ship to leave.  At that time, more than half of 
the original ash remained on the ship. 
 Fuentes testified that Reilly then instructed him to 
take the ship to Ocean Cay in the Bahamas to pick up a small 
bulldozer called a "bobcat."  See R. app. at 663-64.  After 
picking up the bulldozer, the Khian Sea went to Ft. Pierce, 
Florida, where Reilly boarded the ship, and according to Fuentes, 
promised the ship's officers and crew additional compensation to 
begin dumping the ash into the ocean while en route to West 
Africa.  Id. at 673-74.  The Khian Sea left Ft. Pierce but before 
it began the dumping, "AMALGAMATED ANNAPOLIS" sent Fuentes a 
radiotelegram instructing him to "SUSPEND OPERATIONS" and proceed 
to Philadelphia.  Id. at 679-80, 1189.  Fuentes received another 
radiotelegram on February 27, 1988, signed "AMALGAMATED" 
instructing him to "CALL 301 544 2909 AT 1900 TODAY."  Id. at 
1192.  The phone number was Reilly's home phone number, which 
Fuentes frequently called to contact Reilly.  Id. at 686. 
 The Khian Sea entered Delaware Bay on March 1, 1988, 
and anchored at Big Stone Beach.  See D. app. at 71.  While the 
ship was anchored there, Paolino and Coastal Carriers engaged in 
negotiations regarding the disposal of the ash.  However, they 
could not reach an agreement on the price for disposal.  See U.S. 
app. at 3-4.  During this period, Reilly boarded the Khian Sea 
several times, and according to Fuentes, he and Reilly discussed 
the execution of the dumping plan they had developed in Ft. 
Pierce.  Subsequently, Reilly directed Fuentes to leave for the 
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Atlantic, and the Khian Sea left the Delaware Bay on May 22, 
1988, against the orders of the Coast Guard.  See D. app. at 278; 
R. app. at 699-700, 854; U.S. app. at 5, 239-40. 
 A few days after the Khian Sea left the Delaware Bay, 
its crew began dumping the ash into the Atlantic Ocean.  This 
dumping continued for about two weeks, but stopped when "all the 
equipment broke down."  See R. app. at 855.  During the two-week 
period of dumping, Fuentes and Reilly communicated frequently. 
See D. app. at 281-92.  Subsequently, in July 1988, the Khian 
Sea docked in Bijela, Yugoslavia, for repairs.  See R. app. at 
856.0 
 Reilly wrote to the American Bureau of Shipping to 
request that the ship be reclassified inasmuch as it had lost its 
classification after leaving the Delaware Bay without 
permission.0  However, on August 17, 1988, the Bureau sent a 
letter to Reilly informing him that its surveyor could not 
examine the holds because "the vessel remains about half loaded 
with cargo," see U.S. app. at 259, and thus, the ship only was 
authorized to sail directly to Manila for completion of the 
reclassification surveys, id. at 63. 
                     
0While the ship was in Yugoslavia, Lily "sold" the ship and its 
cargo to Romo Shipping for $10, and the ship was renamed the 
Felicia.  However, Lily and Romo had the same post office box in 
Freeport, Bahamas, and, as noted above, both were headed by 
Robert Cordes.  See R. app. at 1167.  Moreover, Coastal Carriers 
continued to act as the agent for the ship.  Throughout our 
opinion, we will refer to the ship as the Khian Sea. 
0Before a ship can accept commercial cargoes, it must obtain a 
"classification" certifying that it is seaworthy and able safely 
to carry certain cargoes.  The ship must be "reclassified" 
periodically.  See U.S. app. at 34-35. 
8 
 Reilly met with Fuentes in Yugoslavia, and told him 
that: (1) Kimon Berbillis, a representative of Romo Shipping, 
would give him instructions regarding the remainder of the trip; 
(2) if no country agreed to accept the remaining ash, it would be 
dumped in the ocean; and (3) they would refer to the ash as 
"ballast."  See D. app. at 299, 304-05.  The ship left Yugoslavia 
and transited the Suez Canal in September 1988.  Id. at 300-01. 
Subsequently, Fuentes received a radiotelegram from Berbillis, 
stating that Fuentes should arrive in Colombo, Sri Lanka, with 
only "500 TONS" of ballast, and that Reilly would cable him 
information he had requested.  See R. app. at 1214.  The next 
day, Fuentes received confirmation from Annapolis that the ship 
should arrive in Colombo with only 500 tons on board.  Id. at 
1215.  In accordance with these instructions, Fuentes dumped all 
but 500 tons of the remaining ash into the Indian Ocean.  Id. at 
719-20. 
 On October 9, 1988, Fuentes received a radiotelegram 
directing him to proceed to Singapore, instead of to Colombo, see 
id. at 1216, and on October 15, he received a radiotelegram 
directing him to dump the remaining 500 tons of ash, id. at 1218. 
Prior to the ship's arrival in Singapore, Reilly telefaxed a 
letter to the American Bureau of Shipping, stating that the Khian 
Sea would arrive in Singapore "for the completion of class work." 
See U.S. app. at 261.  When the ship arrived in Singapore in  
November 1988, its cargo holds were empty.  According to Fuentes, 
Dowd boarded the ship in Singapore, removed gear that had been 
used in the dumping operation, see R. app. at 729-30, and told 
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Fuentes to replace the ship's logbook with a falsified logbook, 
see D. app. 322-25, and to tell any inquiring journalists that 
the ash had been dumped in a country which could not be revealed, 
id. at 320.  The Khian Sea then proceeded to Shanghai, where it 
was reclassified.  See U.S. app. at 64.  Fuentes left the ship at 
this point, taking copies of radiotelegrams and communication 
logs with him.  See R. app. at 665, 739. 
     
 B. Procedural History 
 Paolino filed suit against Coastal Carriers, 
Amalgamated, and others, and on June 2, 1988, the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania issued a 
preliminary injunction, enjoining the defendants, their officers, 
and their agents from off-loading or disposing of the ash without 
first providing Paolino with at least three days written notice 
of the proposed place, manner, and method of disposal.  The 
district court held a contempt hearing on December 15, 1988, to 
determine if the defendants had violated the preliminary 
injunction.  At the hearing, Reilly was asked, under oath, 
whether he had "any knowledge . . . as to what happened to the 
incinerator residue" on board the Khian Sea, or "any knowledge as 
to the means by which it might be ascertained what happened to 
the residue."  See U.S. app. at 275.  Reilly responded "[n]o, 
sir" to both questions.  Id. 
 In January 1990, Reilly appeared before a federal grand 
jury for the District of Delaware that was investigating 
potential ocean dumping violations in connection with the 
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activities of the Khian Sea between September 1986 and December 
1988.  Id. at 285-403.  Reilly was informed that the grand jury 
was investigating the disposal of ash from the Khian Sea and was 
advised of his right to leave and seek legal counsel.  He then 
testified that he had no knowledge of what happened to the ash 
and had not directed anyone to remove the ash from the ship.  Id. 
at 376-81. 
 Dowd appeared before the same grand jury on February 
14, 1990.  See U.S. app. at 405-95.  Like Reilly, he was informed 
of the scope of the grand jury's investigation and his rights. 
Dowd then testified that he did not have "any idea" what happened 
to the ash on board the Khian Sea.  See D. app. at 212-13. 
 On June 14, 1992, an indictment was returned in the 
District of Delaware charging Dowd and Reilly with violating 18 
U.S.C. § 1623(a) by knowingly making false declarations before 
the federal grand jury.  See R. app. at 49-57.  Dowd and Reilly 
moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming that it did not allege 
adequately the essential elements of a section 1623(a) violation. 
United States v. Reilly, 811 F. Supp. 177, 179 (D. Del. 1993). 
However, the court held that the indictment alleged with 
sufficient clarity that Dowd and Reilly knowingly made false 
statements before a grand jury, these statements were material to 
the grand jury's investigation, and the questions that elicited 
these false statements were not too vague or ambiguous to support 
convictions under section 1623(a).  811 F. Supp. at 181. 
 On January 25, 1993, an indictment was returned in the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania charging Reilly with violating 
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18 U.S.C. § 1623(a) by knowingly making false declarations during 
the contempt hearing.  See R. app. at 62-66.  Finally, on January 
28, 1993, an information was filed in the District of Delaware, 
charging Reilly with violating 33 U.S.C. § 1411(a), by knowingly 
transporting and causing to be transported material from the 
United States for the purpose of dumping it into ocean waters. R. 
app. at 58-61.  The two indictments and the information were 
consolidated in the District of Delaware.  Prior to trial, Dowd 
and Reilly unsuccessfully moved to disqualify the prosecutor from 
prosecuting the case because he had called them as witnesses 
before the Delaware grand jury.  United States v. Reilly, Crim. 
Nos. 92-53-JJF, 93-8-JJF, 93-10-JJF, Memorandum Opinion at 9 (D. 
Del. May 7, 1993).  Following a jury trial from May 17 to June 3, 
1993, Reilly was convicted of two counts of making false 
declarations and one count of dumping, and Dowd was convicted of 
one count of making a false declaration.    
  
II. DISCUSSION 
 A. Were the radiotelegams authenticated properly? 
 
 The Khian Sea communicated with locations on shore by 
radiotelegram and the district court admitted into evidence 35 of 
the radiotelegrams that allegedly had been sent to or received by 
the Khian Sea between December 1987 and December 1988.  See R. 
app. at 1189-94, 1198-1209, 1212-21, 1226-32.  The district court 
based its evidentiary decision in part on its conclusion that 
there was "sufficient circumstantial evidence" to indicate that 
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the radiotelegrams were what the government claimed.  See U.S. 
app. at 65-67.  Reilly challenges this determination in this 
appeal.  "We review the district court's ruling as to proper 
authentication for abuse of discretion."  United States v. 
McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 328 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 415 
(1992).0 
 Reilly argues that the district court admitted all of 
the 35 radiotelegrams into evidence "on a wholesale basis as Mr. 
Reilly's admissions, irrespective of the very substantial 
differences among them, irrespective of the fact that most of 
them indisputably were sent or received by people other than Mr. 
Reilly[,] . . . and irrespective of the fact that the government 
did not even attempt to demonstrate, much less succeed in 
demonstrating, how each radiotelegram was 'authored' or 'adopted' 
by Mr. Reilly."  See R. br. at 37-38.  Thus, Reilly argues that 
the district court either failed to exercise its discretion or 
abused its discretion by admitting the radiotelegrams as Reilly's 
admissions.  Id. at 38.  Reilly also argues that the government 
should be "estopped" from asserting "that only a few of the 
radiotelegrams were sent by Reilly" and that most of the 
radiotelegrams "were introduced only to show the circumstances in 
which the few radiotelegrams from Mr. Reilly were sent," see R. 
                     
0Neither Reilly nor the government distinguishes between the 
evidence before the district court at the time it ruled that the 
radiotelegrams satisfied the authenticity requirement and the 
evidence introduced later in the trial.  Thus, we review all of 
the evidence relevant to authenticity. 
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reply br. at 12-13, because it did not make this argument to the 
district court, id. at 11.     
 The government argues that it did not attempt to 
authenticate all of the 35 radiotelegrams as Reilly's admissions 
and that the district court did not admit the radiotelegrams on 
this basis.  U.S. br. at 18-19.  The government maintains that 
although it introduced some of the radiotelegrams to "show that 
Reilly knew about and directed the dumping of the ash into the 
ocean[,] [o]thers . . . [were not sent or received by Reilly and] 
were introduced because they interrelate with the incriminating 
radiotelegrams, establishing the factual context and showing 
generally that Fuentes was testifying accurately as to the timing 
and substance of various events."  Id. at 19-20.  According to 
the government, the district court concluded that all of the 35 
radiotelegrams had been authenticated properly based on "the 
detailed testimony of Fuentes that the radiotelegrams were 
communications between Reilly and him, the subject matter of the 
radiotelegrams, their timing and interconnection with each other, 
their connection with undisputed evidence of phone calls between 
Reilly and Fuentes, and Reilly's own admission that he 
communicated with captain Fuentes by cable and phone."  Id. at 
18.    
 We conclude that, contrary to Reilly's allegations, the 
government did not attempt to authenticate all of the 35 
radiotelegrams as Reilly's admissions.  See R. app. at 123-29 
(Memorandum of the United States in Support of the Admission of 
Certain Cables and Other Records of the Khian Sea).  Moreover, 
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although the district court focused on the connections between 
the radiotelegrams and Reilly when citing the circumstantial 
evidence of their authenticity, we do not believe that the 
district court admitted all of the 35 radiotelegrams as Reilly's 
admissions.0  We base this conclusion on the fact that 18 of the 
35 radiotelegrams admitted into evidence were sent from the Khian 
                     
0When ruling that the radiotelegrams satisfied the authenticity 
requirement, the district court stated: 
 
At the moment, I'm inclined to allow the 
government to use the messages, and I do it . 
. . based on my reading of the case law that 
talks about the level of proof necessary for 
authenticity . . . they don't have to be 
perfect in proving it, that your client sent 
these telexes or the messages and . . . 
[there is] sufficient circumstantial evidence 
to . . . [suggest] that they are what the 
government purports that they should be; that 
is, that they appear to be from the same 
location where he was; they appear to include 
contents of materials or communications that 
he would know the substance of the 
communications; and they appear to be in a 
pattern of communications that would suggest 
that if Fuentes received them and then acted 
on them and then responded to them and then 
received a response again from Reilly, all of 
which suggests that whoever it was who was 
sending the messages had knowledge of the 
transaction and the matters involved. 
 And I understand there's a risk that the 
sender may have been someone else other than 
Reilly.  And by admitting them and finding 
that the government has reasonably satisfied 
[the] authenticity [requirement], I'm not 
making a finding that Reilly is absolutely 
the person who sent them.  I'm making a 
finding that there's sufficient indicia of 
authenticity to allow them to be admitted 
into evidence. 
 
See U.S. app. at 65-66. 
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Sea, not to the Khian Sea, and the fact that certain 
radiotelegrams are communications between the Khian Sea and 
parties not associated with Reilly, including the Consul of the 
Republic of Honduras and the United States Coast Guard.  Thus, we 
review the evidence of authenticity in this light. 
 Fed. R. Evid. 901(a) states that "[t]he requirement of 
authentication or identification as a condition precedent to 
admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a 
finding that the matter in question is what its proponent 
claims."  "Rule 901(a) treats preliminary questions of 
authentication and identification as matters of conditional 
relevance according to the standards of Rule 104(b).  The 
condition of fact which must be fulfilled by every offer of real 
proof is whether the evidence is what its proponent claims."  5 
Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 
¶901(a)[01] at 901-15 (1993).   
 Fed. R. Evid. 901(b) provides examples of appropriate 
methods of authentication.  These examples include "[t]estimony 
that a matter is what it is claimed to be," Rule 901(b)(1), and 
"[a]ppearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other 
distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with 
circumstances," Rule 901(b)(4).  Thus, "[i]t is clear that the 
connection between a message (either oral or written) and its 
source may be established by circumstantial evidence."  United 
States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49, 71 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. 
denied, 405 U.S. 936, 92 S.Ct. 949 (1972).  Moreover, "[a]ny 
combination of items of evidence illustrated by Rule 901(b) . . . 
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will suffice so long as Rule 901(a) is satisfied."  5 Weinstein's 
Evidence ¶ 901(b)(1)[01] at 901-32.  Finally, "[t]he burden of 
proof for authentication is slight."  Link v. Mercedes-Benz of 
North America, Inc., 788 F.2d 918, 927 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting 
McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust Co., 779 F.2d 916, 928 (3d Cir. 
1985)).  We have explained that 
'the showing of authenticity is not on a par 
with more technical evidentiary rules, such 
as hearsay exceptions, governing 
admissibility.  Rather, there need be only a 
prima facie showing, to the court, of 
authenticity, not a full argument on 
admissibility.  Once a prima facie case is 
made, the evidence goes to the jury and it is 
the jury who will ultimately determine the 
authenticity of the evidence, not the court. 
The only requirement is that there has been 
substantial evidence from which they could 
infer that the document was authentic.' 
McGlory, 968 F.2d at 328-29 (quoting Link, 788 F.2d at 928 
(quoting United States v. Goichman, 547 F.2d 778, 784 (3d Cir. 
1976))) (emphasis omitted); see also Michael H. Graham, Federal 
Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 6821 at 849 (Interim Edition 
1992) ("Satisfaction of the requirement of authentication or 
identification is a matter to be approached in accordance with 
Rule 104(b).  Accordingly once the court finds that evidence has 
been introduced sufficient to permit a reasonable juror to find 
that the matter in question is what its proponent claims, a 
sufficient foundation for introduction in evidence has been laid, 
Rule 104(b).") (citations omitted). 
 There are several witnesses whose testimony supports 
the authenticity of the 35 radiotelegrams.  One of these 
witnesses is Humberto Carcamo Arias (Carcamo), the Khian Sea's 
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radio operator.  He identified the radiotelegrams based on their 
appearance and content.  See U.S. app. at 101-17.  Carcamo 
testified that he transmitted the radiotelegrams sent from the 
Khian Sea and transcribed the radiotelegrams received by the 
Khian Sea.  Moreover, he described the procedures that he used 
when sending and receiving the radiotelegrams.  According to 
Carcamo, he would receive a handwritten message from Fuentes and 
then type the message on a SAIT Electronics radiotelegram form 
"to send it to Sait, S-a-i-t, Electronics.  The original copy for 
them, one copy for us, and one copy for the head office."  Id. at 
102.  Carcamo received incoming radiotelegrams from coastal 
stations that transmitted the messages to the ship in Morse code. 
Upon receiving these messages, Carcamo decoded them, transcribed 
them, and delivered them to Fuentes.  Id. at 103-04.  Finally, 
Carcamo stated that he placed his initials "HCA" on the records 
of all the outgoing and incoming radiotelegrams he prepared.  Id. 
at 102-03.  Each of the 35 radiotelegrams admitted into evidence 
bears his initials, corroborating his testimony.    
 Fuentes's testimony also supports the authenticity of 
the radiotelegrams.  Fuentes testified that he sent or received 
each of the 35 radiotelegrams admitted into evidence and 
corroborated Carcamo's testimony regarding Carcamo's role in the 
transmission and receipt of the radiotelegrams.  See R. app. at 
653-55, 668-69.  Fuentes's testimony also indicates that the 12 
radiotelegrams admitted into evidence that originated in 
Annapolis were from Reilly and that the three radiotelegrams 
admitted into evidence that the Khian Sea sent to Annapolis were 
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sent to Reilly.  Fuentes testified that he was hired by Reilly, 
that he took his directions from Reilly, id. at 649-51, and that 
while he was at sea, Reilly was the "only person" he knew in 
Annapolis and was his primary contact at Coastal Carriers and 
Amalgamated Shipping, id. at 654, 659, 680.   Other testimony 
links these radiotelegrams with Reilly.  Clare Dobbins, a 
secretary at Reilly's office in Annapolis, testified that she 
witnessed Reilly receive radiotelegrams from the Khian Sea, and 
sometimes delivered them to him from the telex machine.  See U.S. 
app. at 23-24, 28.  Finally, Reilly admitted that he was in 
contact with Fuentes, and that he communicated with him by phone 
and by cable on behalf of Coastal Carriers and Amalgamated.  Id. 
at 159, 182, 196.   
   In addition to the testimony authenticating the 
radiotelegrams, there are multiple pieces of circumstantial 
evidence that support the conclusion that the radiotelegrams are 
what the government claims they are, namely radiotelegrams to and 
from the Khian Sea, many of which were sent or received by 
Reilly.  First, Fuentes, the captain of the Khian Sea during the 
time period at issue, provided the radiotelegrams to the 
government in January 1992, when he came to the United States to 
testify before the grand jury regarding the activities of the 
Khian Sea.  See R. app. at 739.  Fuentes testified that although 
he received instructions from the "company" to destroy documents 
that might prompt an investigation into the whereabouts of the 
ash, see id. at 754, he took all of the radiotelegrams with him 
when he left the Khian Sea, and then provided them to the 
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government in January 1992, id. at 665, 739.0  Although this 
evidence is not "dispositive" on the question of the 
radiotelegrams' authenticity, it "is surely probative."  See 
McQueeney, 779 F.2d at 929 ("the fact that the copies were 
produced by the plaintiff in answer to an explicit discovery 
request for his Sea Service Records, while not dispositive on the 
issue of authentication, is surely probative.").   
 Second, the appearance of the radiotelegrams also 
supports the conclusion that they are authentic.  They are typed 
on forms bearing the letterhead "SAIT ELECTRONICS" and the label 
"RADIOTELEGRAM."  Moreover, as we noted above, each of the 35 
radiotelegrams admitted into evidence bears Carcamo's initials, 
"HCA", in either the location designated for the name of the 
party sending the radiotelegram or the location designated for 
the party receiving the radiotelegram.  "The specificity, 
regularity, and official appearance of the documents increase the 
likelihood of their being authentic."  Id. (citations omitted).  
 Third, "the contents of the . . . [radiotelegrams] tend 
to support their claim to authenticity," id., by linking many of 
them to Reilly.  Of the 18 radiotelegrams in evidence that were 
sent by the Khian Sea, three were sent to Annapolis, and of the 
17 radiotelegrams in evidence received by the Khian Sea, 12 
originated in Annapolis.  See R. app. at 1186-1232.  Annapolis, 
of course, was the site of the Coastal Carriers office where 
Reilly worked.  Moreover, the three radiotelegrams in evidence 
                     
0Carcamo also testified that Fuentes took the radiotelegrams with 
him when he left the Khian Sea.  See U.S. app. at 117. 
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sent to Annapolis from the Khian Sea were sent to Reilly's telex 
number at Coastal Carriers.  Id. at 1200, 1209, 1232.0     
 Of the 12 radiotelegrams in evidence that were received 
by the Khian Sea and originated in Annapolis, three were signed 
"COALCOAST," see id. at 1215, 1216, 1220, one was unsigned, id. 
at 1218, five were signed "AMALGAMATED ANNAPOLIS," or 
"AMALGAMATED," id. at 1189, 1192, 1193, 1199, 1207, and three 
were signed "MASCO," id. at 1203, 1205, 1206.  Reilly testified 
that "COALCOAST" was the "callback" for Coastal Carriers, the 
company at which he was vice president.  See U.S. app. at 194. 
Moreover, Coastal Carriers represented Amalgamated, and one of 
the radiotelegrams signed "AMALGAMATED" contained a message 
instructing Fuentes to call "301 544 2909," Reilly's home phone 
number, see R. app. at 1192.0  Before the Khian Sea received any 
radiotelegrams signed "MASCO," it received a radiotelegram signed 
"AMALGAMATED SHIPPING CORPORATION" and stating "PLEASE REPLY 
AMALGAMATED CARE OF MASCO FREEPORT BAHAMAS," id. at 1201. 
Furthermore, a radiotelegram signed "MASCO" and dated June 18, 
1988, stated "DO NOT CALL DAYTIME."  Id. at 1205.  The primary 
numbers that Fuentes called for business purposes were Reilly's. 
Finally, the unsigned radiotelegram sent from Annapolis included 
the following message "COMFROM [sic] ROMO COASTAL CARRIERS 
CORPORATION ANNAPOLIS MARYLAND RCA 205654 OR T/X 7108678557" 
containing the Coastal Carriers telex number.  Id. at 1218.   
                     
0It is undisputed that the telex number for Coastal Carriers was 
7108678557.  See R. app. at 1218. 
0It is undisputed that Reilly's home phone number was 301-544-
2909.  See U.S. app. at 17. 
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 The Khian Sea's logs of outgoing radiotelegrams and 
phone calls also support the conclusion that Reilly sent the 
radiotelegrams originating in Annapolis, because they are 
consistent with Fuentes's testimony that he was reporting to 
Reilly and taking directions from him via telephone and telex. In 
considering the logs it is, of course, important to recognize 
that there are far more radiotelegrams listed than were admitted 
into evidence.  The log covering December 1987 through February 
1988 indicates that ten radiotelegrams were sent from the Khian 
Sea to the telex in Reilly's office at Coastal Carriers in 
Annapolis.  Id. at 1186-88.0  The log covering May 1988 through 
July 1988 indicates that the Khian Sea sent four radiotelegrams 
to Annapolis, id. at 1195, and that Fuentes made five phone calls 
to Reilly's home phone number and four phone calls to Reilly's 
office number, id. at 1196-97.0  The log covering September 1988 
through October 1988 identifies three phone calls from the Khian 
Sea to Reilly's home, and three to Reilly's office.  Id. at 1210-
11.  Finally, the log covering November 1988 through December 
1988 indicates that the Khian Sea sent two radiotelegrams to 
Reilly's office and that two phone calls were made to Reilly's 
home number and two to his office number.  Id. at 1222-24.      
 Finally, as the government argues, the messages in the 
radiotelegrams and their relationship to each other, to Fuentes's 
                     
0As we noted above, it is undisputed that the telex number for 
Coastal Carriers was 7108678557.  See R. app. at 1218. 
0As we noted above, it is undisputed that Reilly's home phone 
number was 301-544-2909.  It is also undisputed that the office 
phone numbers for Coastal Carriers were 301-268-9797, 301-268-
9798, and 301-268-9799.  See U.S. app. at 17, 19-20, 137-138. 
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testimony, and to other evidence indicate that Reilly sent the 
radiotelegrams originating in Annapolis and support the district 
court's conclusion that all of the radiotelegrams in evidence 
satisfied the authenticity requirement.  See U.S. br. at 24-31. A 
letter or telegram "may be authenticated by its contents with or 
without the aid of physical characteristics if the letter is 
shown to contain information that persons other than the 
purported sender are not likely to possess."  Graham, Federal 
Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 6825 at 865-68; see also 
United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 661 (3d Cir. 1993) ("'a 
document or telephone conversation may be shown to have emanated 
from a particular person by virtue of its disclosing knowledge of 
facts known peculiarly to him.'") (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 901 
advisory committee note ex. (4)), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1660 
(1994); 5 Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 901(b)(4)[01] at 901-60 ("A 
letter, for example, can be shown to have emanated from a 
particular person or business by the fact that it would be 
unlikely for anyone other than the purported writer to be 
familiar with its subject matter and content.").  "Although we do 
not know precisely how many people had the information contained 
in the proffered evidence, we suspect, as noted above, that the 
number is small.  Therefore, the nature of the information in the 
documents further supports their authenticity."  McQueeney v. 
Wilmington Trust Co., 779 F.2d at 930.  Moreover, "[w]here 
letters [or telegrams] fit into a course of correspondence or a 
progressive course of action, proof of the letters' relationship 
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to these events can authenticate any of the letters [or 
telegrams]."  5 Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 901(b)(4)[04] at 901-75.  
 The messages contained in the radiotelegrams, and the 
way in which they relate to each other, to Fuentes's 
conversations with Reilly, and to the activities of the Khian Sea 
link Reilly to the 12 radiotelegrams from Annapolis and one which 
Berbillis sent to the Khian Sea from Greece.  A persuasive 
example of this circumstantial evidence is "the series of 
radiotelegrams introduced as Govt. Exhibit 69, and . . . [their 
relationship] to the testimony of Captain Fuentes and other 
documents."  U.S. br. at 24.  According to Fuentes, Reilly told 
him to take directions from Kimon Berbillis once the Khian Sea 
left Yugoslavia, that Abdel Hakim, a vice president of Romo 
Shipping, also might send him messages, see R. app. at 714, 723, 
and that "ballast" was to be the code word for the incinerator 
ash on board the Khian Sea, id. at 719-21.  Thus, the record 
supports the conclusion that Berbillis and Hakim were acting on 
behalf of Reilly or at his behest.  Id. at 714-17, 723-24. 
Government Exhibit 69A is a radiotelegram that Fuentes sent to 
Berbillis on September 29, 1988, stating that the ship had 
departed Suez, and that "NO RADIO CONTACT WAS POSSIBLE WITH 
HAKIM," and asking Berbillis to "PLEASE SEND INSTRUCT [sic] HOW 
MUCH BALLAST SHOULD I ARRIVE WITH."  Id. at 1212.  Fuentes 
testified that Government Exhibit 69B is the second radiotelegram 
he sent to Berbillis.  In this radiotelegram, Fuentes asks for 
instructions on what to do when he arrives in Colombo, Sri Lanka, 
and states that he had "NO SUCCESS ON PHONE TO USA."  Id. at 
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1213.  According to Fuentes, the person he was trying to reach in 
the "USA" was Reilly.  Id. at 717.   
 Moreover, Government Exhibit 69C is Berbillis's reply 
to Fuentes's request for instructions, and it states, "PLEASE 
DELAY YOU ETA UNTIL NOON OCTOBER 14 STOP TRY ARRIVE WITH 500 TONS 
IN ONEHOLD STOP REILLY WILL CABLE YOU INFO YOU REQUESTED."  Id. 
at 1214 (emphasis added).   
A common aspect of authentication permissible 
under Rule 901(b)(4) is the reply doctrine 
which provides that once a letter, telegram, 
or telephone call is shown to have been 
mailed, sent or made, a letter, telegram or 
telephone call shown by its contents to be in 
reply is authenticated without more. 
Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 6825 at 868-
69; 5 Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 901(b)(4)[05] at 901-76 ("A letter 
can be authenticated by testimony or other proof that it was sent 
in reply to a duly authenticated writing.  A reply letter often 
needs no further authentication because it would be unlikely for 
anyone other than the purported writer to know and respond to the 
contents of an earlier letter addressed to him.").  Accordingly, 
inasmuch as Fuentes's testimony authenticates Government Exhibit 
69B, and 69C is a reply to 69B, 69C satisfies the authenticity 
requirement.  Of course, the contents of Government Exhibit 69C 
also link the radiotelegram to Reilly, whose name is mentioned 
explicitly in the radiotelegram. 
 Government Exhibit 69C helps authenticate Government 
Exhibit 69D.  According to Government Exhibit 69C, Reilly was 
going to send Fuentes a radiotelegram containing instructions 
regarding his arrival in Sri Lanka and how much "ballast" Fuentes 
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should arrive with.  One day after receiving this radiotelegram, 
Fuentes received Government Exhibit 69D, a radiotelegram from 
Annapolis that was signed "COALCOAST" and stated "SUGGEST ARRIVE 
COLOMBO PM 14TH WITH ONLY 500 TONS BALLAST ADVISING AGENTS OTHERS 
DETAILS LATER CONFIRM ROMO."  R. app. at 1215.  The log of the 
ship's outgoing calls and radiotelegrams indicates that Fuentes 
called Reilly's home phone number on October 9, the following 
day, id. at 1210, and Fuentes testified that both the 
radiotelegram and Reilly's statements on the phone were 
instructions to dump all but 500 tons of the remaining ash, id. 
at 719-20.  The radiotelegram admitted as Government Exhibit 69D 
and its relationship (1) to Berbillis's earlier radiotelegram, 
(2) to the record of Fuentes's call to Reilly and (3) to 
Fuentes's testimony, authenticate Government Exhibit 69D and 
indicate that it came from Reilly.  It is unlikely that someone 
other than Reilly would use the alleged code word "ballast," and 
send Fuentes instructions regarding his arrival in Colombo and 
how many tons of ballast to arrive with, especially in light of 
Berbillis's earlier radiotelegram.  See 5 Weinstein's Evidence 
¶901(b)(4)[01] at 901-66 ("The use of code words or other names 
or nuances of speech particularly known or used by the purported 
writer can authenticate a writing.").      
 Fuentes received a second radiotelegram on October 9 
that also was signed "COALCOAST" and instructed him to go to 
Singapore instead of to Sri Lanka.  See R. app. at 1216.  The 
circumstances indicate that Reilly also sent this radiotelegram, 
Government Exhibit 69E.  After receiving this radiotelegram, 
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Fuentes sent a radiotelegram (Government Exhibit 69F) to 
Berbillis, informing him that the ship was going to Singapore. 
Id. at 1217.  Subsequently, on October 15, Fuentes received an 
unsigned radiotelegram (Government Exhibit 69G) sent from 
Annapolis that stated, "DISPOSE 500 BALLAST PRIOR ARRIVAL 
SINGAPORE . . . CONFORM [sic] ROMO, COASTAL CARRIERS CORPORATION 
ANNAPOLIS MARYLAND RCA 205654 OR T/X 7108679557."  Id. at 1218. 
Fuentes testified that he interpreted the message as an 
instruction to dump the remaining 500 tons of ash.  Id. at 725. 
Fuentes's testimony, the reference to the "500 BALLAST" which 
appeared earlier in Government Exhibit 69D, the references to 
Coastal Carriers and its telex number in Annapolis, and the 
context of the radiotelegram more than suffice to authenticate 
this radiotelegram and to support the inference that Reilly sent 
it.  Again, it is unlikely that someone other than Reilly would 
use the alleged code word "ballast," be aware of the facts that 
the ship had only 500 tons of ash remaining in its holds and that 
it was scheduled to arrive in Singapore, and send Fuentes 
instructions to dispose of the remaining ash. 
 On the day that Fuentes received this radiotelegram, 
Fuentes sent another radiotelegram to Berbillis (Government 
Exhibit 69H) informing him that the ship's arrival in Singapore 
would be delayed until November 5, due to "TROUBLES WITH DOZZER 
AND GENERATORS ETC ETC PLUS FINAL CLEANING HARDER THAN EXPECTED." 
Id. at 1219.  Fuentes testified that on the following day, he 
spoke with Reilly about the ash dumping process, id. at 726, and 
the log of the ship's outgoing calls and radiotelegrams confirms 
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that he called Reilly's home phone number that day, id. at 1210. 
Finally, on October 19, a letter bearing the typed signature of 
Reilly was faxed from Coastal Carriers to the American Bureau of 
Shipping, informing it that the Khian Sea would arrive in 
Singapore "for completion of class work commenced in Bijela, 
Yugoslavia."  See U.S. app. at 261.  Reilly knew that the "class 
work" could not be completed until the ship's holds were empty.0  
Thus, the source, typed signature, and message indicate that 
Reilly sent this letter, and support our conclusion that Reilly 
sent the radiotelegrams originating in Annapolis, and that, 
having authorized Berbillis to communicate with Fuentes on his 
behalf, Reilly was informed of the contents of their 
correspondence.  
 Reilly argues that four of the radiotelegrams allegedly 
sent from the Khian Sea to Athens, Greece, during the period when 
the crew allegedly was dumping ash into the Indian Ocean were not 
properly authenticated because, although they bore Carcamo's 
initials, "Carcamo himself testified that he 'didn't transmit any 
message' during that period because of 'captain's order' not to 
do so."  See R. br. at 40 n.8 (quoting R. app. at 885-86). 
However, Fuentes testified that he only instructed Carcamo not to 
communicate with passing ships during the dumping operation, and 
that the Khian Sea remained in contact with Annapolis.  See R. 
                     
0On August 17, 1988, the American Bureau of Shipping sent a 
letter to Reilly informing him that its surveyor could not 
conduct the examination required for reclassification of the 
Khian Sea because "the vessel remains about half loaded with 
cargo," see U.S. app. at 259. 
28 
app. at 837-38.  It is well-established that "upon consideration 
of the evidence as a whole, if a sufficient foundation has been 
laid in support of introduction, contradictory evidence goes to 
the weight to be assigned by the trier of fact and not to 
admissibility."  Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence 
§ 6821 at 850 (citation omitted); 5 Weinstein's Evidence 
¶901(a)[01] at 901-17 ("The issue of credibility and probative 
force is for the jury."). 
 Thus, we conclude that the evidence was more than 
adequate to authenticate the 35 radiotelegrams admitted into 
evidence.  Moreover, even if the four incoming radiotelegrams 
that the evidence does not link to Reilly were not authenticated 
properly, see R. app. at 1201 (68D), 1202 (68E), 1226 (70A), 1228 
(70C), their admission into evidence was harmless.0  "Trial error 
is harmless if it is highly probable that the error did not 
affect the judgment."  United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 546 
(3d Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Simon, 995 F.2d 1236, 
1244 (3d Cir. 1993)).  See also Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 
1490, 1500 (3d Cir. 1993).  We have held that "[h]igh probability 
exists if the court has a 'sure conviction that the error did not 
prejudice the defendant.'"  Copple, 24 F.3d at 546 (quoting 
Simon, 955 F.2d at 1244).  As the government argues, "[t]he jury 
could reasonably find that the radiotelegrams introduced as GE 
69D and 69G (R. app. 1215, 1218) were orders from Reilly to dump 
ash into the ocean."  See U.S. br. at 27.  Consequently, we are 
                     
0These radiotelegrams should not be confused with the four 
radiotelegrams the Khian Sea sent to Athens. 
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convinced that the district court's admission of the four 
incoming radiotelegrams not linked to Reilly did not prejudice 
him, as these radiotelegrams only provided additional context for 
the truly incriminating radiotelegrams which the evidence did 
link to Reilly.      
 
 B. Did the radiotelegrams constitute inadmissible                    
hearsay? 
 Fed. R. Evid. 801 defines hearsay as a "statement other 
than one made by a declarant while testifying at the trial or 
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted."  Hearsay is generally inadmissible because 
'the statement is inherently untrustworthy: 
the declarant may not have been under oath at 
the time of the statement, his or her 
credibility cannot be evaluated at trial, and 
he or she cannot be cross-examined.' 
United States v. Console, 13 F.3d at 656 (quoting United States 
v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193, 203 (3d Cir. 1992)).  "We exercise 
plenary review over the district court's interpretation of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence but review a ruling based on a 
permissible interpretation of a rule for abuse of discretion." 
Console, 13 F.3d at 656 (citations omitted). 
 We accept Reilly's contention that the incoming 
radiotelegrams to the Khian Sea were the product of three out-of-
court "statements": (1) the sender's statement to a coastal 
station operator, (2) the coastal station's transmission of the 
message in Morse code to the Khian Sea, and (3) Carcamo's 
documenting of the message.  See R. br. at 44.  Rule 805 provides 
that, "[h]earsay included within hearsay is not excluded under 
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the hearsay rule if each part of the combined statements conforms 
with an exception to the hearsay rule."  See Fed. R. Evid. 805. 
However, Reilly argues that each of these "statements" 
constitutes inadmissible hearsay and that therefore the district 
court abused its discretion by admitting the incoming 
radiotelegrams into evidence.  See R. br. at 43-48.  We disagree. 
 Our review indicates that each of the three 
"statements" reflected in 13 of the 17 incoming radiotelegrams in 
evidence, the 12 from Reilly and the one from Berbillis in 
Greece, was admissible.  The initial statement reflected in the 
incoming radiotelegrams, the statement by the sender to a coastal 
station operator, consists of several components: (1) the 
message; (2) the radiotelegram's point of origin and its 
destination; and (3) the date on which the radiotelegram was 
handed in to the coastal station operator.  None of the messages 
contained in the incoming radiotelegrams constitute hearsay 
because they consist largely of instructions to Fuentes.  See R. 
app. at 1189 (Govt. Exh. 67A), 1192 (Govt. Exh. 67D), 1193 (Govt. 
Exh. 67E), 1199 (Govt. Exh. 68B), 1201 (Govt. Exh. 68D), 1202 
(Govt. Exh. 68E), 1203 (Govt. Exh. 68F), 1205 (Govt. Exh. 68H), 
1206 (Govt. Exh. 68I), 1207 (Govt. Exh. 68J), 1214 (Govt. Exh. 
69C), 1215 (Govt. Exh. 69D), 1216 (Govt. Exh. 69E), 1218 (Govt. 
Exh. 69G), 1220 (Govt. Exh. 69I), 1226 (Govt. Exh. 70A), 1228 
(Govt. Exh. 70C).  "Instructions to an individual to do something 
are . . . not hearsay,"  Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: 
Evidence § 6705 at 409, because they are not declarations of fact 
and therefore are not capable of being true or false,  Crawford 
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v. Garnier, 719 F.2d 1317, 1323 (7th Cir. 1983), United States v. 
Gibson, 675 F.2d 825, 833-34 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 
972, 103 S.Ct. 305 (1982), United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534,  
558 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 976, 96 S.Ct. 1481 
(1976).   
 As the government argues, the messages "were not 
offered to prove the truth of the statements contained within 
them, but instead to prove the fact that the certain instructions 
had been given,"  see U.S. br. at 32; Anderson v. United States, 
417 U.S. 211, 220 n.8, 94 S.Ct. 2253, 2260 n.8 (1974), and as 
circumstantial evidence of Reilly's state of mind, namely his 
knowledge of the ash dumping operation, 4 Weinstein's Evidence 
¶801(c)[01] at 801-103 ("[a] statement offered to show the state 
of mind of the declarant is analytically not hearsay if the 
declarant does not directly assert the state of mind that is in 
issue.").  Although one of the incoming messages included 
Reilly's phone number, see R. app. at 1192, another included his 
name, id. at 1214, and a third included the telex number at 
Coastal Carriers, id. at 1218, even these three messages do not 
constitute hearsay, because they were offered only as 
circumstantial evidence that Reilly sent the radiotelegrams 
originating in Annapolis.  See McGlory, 968 F.2d at 333 
(documents did not constitute hearsay by virtue of the fact that 
they contained the defendant's name and the names and phone 
numbers of other individuals, as they were "offered merely as 
circumstantial evidence of . . . [defendant's] association" with 
the other individuals).  Thus, the first component of the 
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statements by the sender to a coastal station operator, which we 
refer to as the "messages," did not constitute hearsay. 
Similarly, the typed signatures on the 12 radiotelegrams 
originating in Annapolis did not constitute hearsay as they were 
offered only as circumstantial evidence that the radiotelegrams 
were sent by Reilly.0     
 However, the other components of the statements by the 
sender to the coastal station operator, namely the point of 
origin and destination of each radiotelegram, and the date on 
which each radiotelegram was sent, were introduced to prove their 
truth, i.e., to prove that the radiotelegrams were sent from the 
point of origin to the destination on the designated date.  We 
consider this information to be statements made by the sender and 
then relayed by the coastal station operator because the sender's 
verbal and nonverbal conduct in filing a radiotelegram at a 
particular coastal station on a particular date for transmission 
to a designated location intentionally communicated each of these 
facts to the coastal station operator for transmission.  In 
effect, the sender told the operator these facts so the operator 
could tell them to the Khian Sea.0   
                     
0If the typed signatures actually read "Reilly," then they would 
have been offered for the truth of the matter asserted. However, 
as we discuss below, such radiotelegrams would have been 
admissible, nonetheless, as admissions.  See Fed. R. Evid. 
801(d)(2)(A).  The typed signature "Kimon," see R. app. at 1214, 
on the radiotelegram that the government claims is from Kimon 
Berbillis, is admissible on this basis.  See Fed. R. Evid. 
801(d)(2)(C).    
0If the government had called a coastal station operator as a 
witness, and the operator had testified regarding the receipt and 
transmission of the messages and laid the foundation for the 
introduction of his or her "statements" pursuant to the business 
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 In the 12 radiotelegrams originating in Annapolis, 
these "statements" regarding the point of origin and destination 
of the radiotelegram, and the date on which the radiotelegram was 
sent were admissible pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 
801(d)(2)(A).  Rule 801(d)(2)(A) provides that statements made by 
a party to an action and offered into evidence by an opposing 
party do not constitute hearsay.  As we discussed above, there is 
substantial evidence indicating that Reilly sent the 12 
radiotelegrams originating in Annapolis.0  Annapolis was the site 
of the Coastal Carriers office where Reilly worked, and the 
contents of these 12 radiotelegrams, combined with other 
circumstantial evidence and Fuentes's testimony indicate that 
they were sent by Reilly.   
 In addition to the circumstantial evidence we have 
already discussed, the relationship between Reilly's three sets 
of meetings with Fuentes and certain radiotelegrams that Fuentes 
                                                                  
records exception to the hearsay rule, we would not need to take 
such a complex layered approach to these components of the 
radiotelegrams.  But inasmuch as the operator or operators did 
not testify and the radiotelegrams were not introduced as 
business records of the coastal sending station, our complex 
layered approach to the hearsay analysis is necessary. 
0The dissent maintains that we "effectively and impermissibly 
equate[] our evidentiary rules governing admissibility with the 
slight showing required for authentication."  See dissent 
typescript at 5.  It is true that we rely on the evidence linking 
Reilly to the 12 radiotelegrams originating in Annapolis and the 
radiotelegram from Berbillis both as evidence of the 
radiotelegrams's authenticity and as evidence that the statements 
contained in the radiotelegrams do not constitute hearsay.  We do 
so, however, not because we equate the showings for authenticity 
and admissibility, but because the substantial quantity of 
evidence linking Reilly to these radiotelegrams satisfies not 
only the "slight" showing required for authenticity, but also the 
greater showing required for admissibility. 
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received subsequent to these meetings indicates that the 
radiotelegrams originating in Annapolis were sent by Reilly.0 
First, Reilly met with Fuentes in Ft. Pierce, Florida, and 
according to Fuentes, promised the ship's officers and crew 
members additional compensation to begin dumping the ash while en 
route to West Africa.  Subsequent to this meeting, Fuentes 
received three radiotelegrams from Annapolis, the first 
instructing him to "SUSPEND OPERATIONS" and return to 
Philadelphia, see R. app. at 1189, the second instructing him to 
call "301 544 2909," id. at 1192, Reilly's home phone number, and 
                     
0The dissent contends that our "hearsay analysis is fundamentally 
flawed because it is premised on the assumption that the 12 
radiotelegrams allegedly sent by Reilly originated in Annapolis, 
where Reilly lived and worked.  . . .  Yet, the Government never 
adduced any evidence, apart from the disputed documents 
themselves, that the messages contained in the radiotelegrams had 
actually originated in Annapolis."  See dissent typescript at 7.  
First of all, our hearsay analysis is not premised solely on the 
evidence that 12 of the radiotelegrams originated in Annapolis.  
Evidence that these radiotelegrams originated in Annapolis was 
only one of many pieces of evidence linking these 12 
radiotelegrams to Reilly.  Other pieces of evidence included 
Fuentes's testimony, see maj. typescript at 17, the messages and 
typed signatures contained in the radiotelegrams, id. at 19-20, 
the Khian Sea's logs of outgoing radiotelegrams and phone calls 
which corroborate Fuentes's testimony that he was taking 
directions from Reilly, id. at 20-21, Reilly's admission that he 
communicated with the Khian Sea by radiotelegram, id. at 17, 
Clare Dobbins's testimony that she witnessed Reilly receive 
radiotelegrams from the Khian Sea, id., and the relationship 
between the messages in the radiotelegrams, Fuentes's testimony, 
the activities of the Khian Sea, and the timing of Reilly's three 
sets of meetings with Fuentes, id. at 21-27, 34-36.  Second of 
all, the "documents themselves" are not the only evidence 
indicating that the radiotelegrams originated in Annapolis.  The 
relationship between the outgoing radiotelegrams and calls to 
Annapolis, and the 12 radiotelegrams indicating that they were 
"handed in at Annapolis" also indicates that these radiotelegrams 
were, in fact, sent from Annapolis. 
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the third containing instructions regarding the ship's arrival in 
Philadelphia, id. at 1193.   
 Once the ship returned to Philadelphia, Reilly met with 
Fuentes again, and according to Fuentes, they discussed the 
execution of the dumping plan they had developed.  Subsequent to 
this meeting, after the ship had left Philadelphia, Fuentes 
received a radiotelegram from Annapolis instructing him to 
proceed toward Cape Verde, away from the United States until the 
"MISSION" was accomplished, id. at 1199, along with other 
radiotelegrams containing instructions on how to proceed, id. at 
1203, 1205, 1206, 1207.  According to Fuentes, the crew began 
dumping the ash into the Atlantic Ocean and continued to do so 
until problems developed with the machinery they were using, at 
which point, Fuentes sent a radiotelegram to Reilly stating that 
3500 tons of "CARGO" remained on board, and that the equipment 
needed to off-load the ash had broken.  Id. at 1209.   
 Finally, the third place in which Reilly and Fuentes 
met was Bijela, Yugoslavia.  Fuentes testified that at this 
meeting, Reilly told him that: (1) Kimon Berbillis would give him 
instructions regarding the remainder of the trip; (2) if no 
country agreed to accept the remaining ash, it would be dumped in 
the ocean; and (3) they would refer to the ash as "ballast."  See 
D. app. at 299, 304-05.  Following this meeting, Fuentes received 
a radiotelegram sent from Greece by Berbillis instructing him to 
arrive in Sri Lanka with only 500 tons of ballast (the 13th 
incoming radiotelegram with admissible statements), see R. app. 
at 1214, a radiotelegram originating in Annapolis confirming 
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these instructions, id. at 1215, another radiotelegram from 
Annapolis instructing him to proceed to Singapore instead of Sri 
Lanka, id. at 1216, a third radiotelegram from Annapolis 
instructing him to dispose of the remaining 500 tons of "BALLAST" 
before arriving in Singapore, id. at 1218, and a fourth 
radiotelegram with instructions regarding the ship's arrival in 
Singapore, id. at 1220.  Thus, the relationship between Fuentes's 
testimony regarding the substance of his meetings with Reilly and 
the content of the messages that Fuentes received following his 
meetings with Reilly confirms that the messages originating in 
Annapolis were from Reilly.    
 The radiotelegram originating in Greece bore the typed 
signature "KIMON," Berbillis's first name.  Id. at 1214. 
Fuentes's testimony regarding his contact with Berbillis confirms 
that the radiotelegram was from Berbillis, and indicates that 
Reilly had authorized Berbillis to make the "statements" 
contained in the radiotelegram to Fuentes.  In fact, according to 
Fuentes, Reilly introduced him to Berbillis and specifically told 
him to take instructions from Berbillis once the ship left 
Yugoslavia.  Id. at 714-17, 723-24.0   
 "Rule 801(d)(2)(C) specifically excludes from the 
definition of hearsay any statements used against a party which 
were made by another person authorized by the party to make a 
                     
0The dissent states that "there is no . . . proof to establish 
that Berbillis . . . 'was acting on behalf of Reilly or at his 
behest.'"  See dissent typescript at 13.  However, we find 
Fuentes's testimony sufficient to establish the relationship 
between Reilly and Berbillis. 
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statement concerning the subject."  Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco 
Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1198 (3d Cir. 1993).  In light of the 
evidence indicating that Reilly authorized Berbillis to send 
instructions to Fuentes on his behalf, the statements made by 
Berbillis to a coastal station operator, see R. app. at 1214, are 
admissible pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(C).  See Graham, Federal 
Practice and Procedure: Evidence §6722 at 503-04 ("Authorization 
to make a statement concerning the subject matter may . . . be 
established by the acts or conduct of the principal or his 
statements to the agent or third party."); see also Michaels v. 
Michaels, 767 F.2d 1185, 1201 (7th Cir. 1985) (held that telexes 
sent by a third party to potential buyers of defendant's company 
were admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(C) because "[v]iewing the 
other evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, . . 
. [the defendant] authorized . . . [the third party] to act as 
the Company's broker and contact . . . potential buyers."), cert. 
denied, 474 U.S. 1057, 106 S.Ct. 797 (1986).  Thus, in 13 of the 
17 incoming radiotelegrams in evidence, all components of the 
statements by the sender to the coastal station operator, namely 
the messages, the "statements" regarding the point of origin and 
destination of each radiotelegram, and the "statements" regarding 
the date on which each radiotelegram was sent, were admissible.  
 The second set of "statements" reflected in the 
incoming radiotelegrams consists of the statements made by the 
coastal operators to the Khian Sea.  In the 12 radiotelegrams in 
evidence sent by Reilly and the radiotelegram in evidence sent by 
Berbillis, the statements by the coastal operators to the Khian 
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Sea also were admissible pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(C) because 
they were "statement[s] by a person [the coastal operators] 
authorized by . . . [Reilly, either directly or indirectly 
through Berbillis] to make a statement concerning the subject" of 
the radiotelegram.  Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(C).   
 For the same reason, the third "statement" reflected in 
the 12 radiotelegrams sent by Reilly and the one from Berbillis, 
Carcamo's documenting of the radiotelegrams, does not constitute 
hearsay.  Id.0  Moreover, Carcamo's documenting of the incoming 
radiotelegrams also would be admissible under Rule 803(6), the 
exception for records of regularly conducted business. See U.S. 
br. at 33.  This exception authorizes the admission of: 
[a] memoranda, report, record, or data 
compilation, in any form, of acts, events, 
conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at 
or near the time by, or from information 
transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if 
kept in the course of a regularly conducted 
business activity, and if it was the regular 
practice of that business activity to make 
the memoranda, report, record, or data 
compilation, all as shown by the testimony of 
the custodian or other qualified witness, 
unless the source of information or the 
method or circumstances of preparation 
indicate lack of trustworthiness. 
                     
0The dissent contends that there is no proof that Reilly 
authorized coastal station operators to transmit the 
radiotelegrams or authorized Carcamo to decode and document the 
radiotelegrams.  See dissent typescript at 13-14.  In our 
opinion, Fuentes's testimony, Reilly's admission that he 
communicated with the Khian Sea by radiotelegram, Clare Dobbins's 
testimony that she witnessed Reilly receive radiotelegrams from 
the Khian Sea, and the plethora of other circumstantial evidence 
linking Reilly to the radiotelegrams more than suffice to 
establish that Reilly authorized the coastal station operators 
and Carcamo to play their respective roles in the transmission of 
the radiotelegrams. 
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Carcamo was a witness "qualified" to lay the foundation required 
by Rule 803(6) for the admission of the radiotelegrams because as 
the radio operator for the Khian Sea, he was responsible for 
creating and storing them, and had "the ability to attest to the 
foundational requirements of Rule 803(6)."  Console, 13 F.3d at 
657. 
The foundation requirements to which a 
qualified witness must attest are:  '(1) 
[that] the declarant in the records had 
knowledge to make accurate statements; (2) 
that the declarant recorded statements 
contemporaneously with the actions which were 
the subject of the reports; (3) that the 
declarant made the record in the regular 
course of the business activity; and (4) that 
such records were regularly kept by the 
business.'  
Id. at 657 (quoting United States v. Furst, 886 F.2d 558, 571 (3d 
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1062, 110 S.Ct. 878 (1990)).   
 Carcamo testified to the four foundation requirements 
of the business records exception by testifying that: he was the 
radio operator for the Khian Sea during the relevant period of 
time, see R. app. at 863; that he was responsible for contacting 
the coastal stations to receive and transmit radiotelegrams for 
the ship and for keeping records of all communications to and 
from the ship, id. at 863-64; that the coastal stations 
transmitted messages to the ship in Morse code, id. at 866-67; 
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that he had years of experience as a radio operator and was 
trained in Morse code, id. at 867-68; and that he decoded the 
Morse code signals, and documented the messages as soon as he 
received them, id., and then delivered the written messages to 
Fuentes, id. at 867.  Carcamo also kept a file of the incoming 
and outgoing messages.  Id. at 863, 869.  Carcamo's testimony 
"satisfied the foundation requirements of Rule 803(6) because it 
'demonstrate[d] that the records . . . [of the radiotelegrams] 
were made contemporaneously with the act the documents 
purport[ed] to record by someone with knowledge of the subject 
matter, that they were made in the regular course of business, 
and that such records were regularly kept by the business.'" 
Console, 13 F.3d at 657 (quoting United States v. Pelullo, 964 
F.2d at 201).  Moreover, Fuentes's testimony corroborated 
Carcamo's testimony regarding his responsibilities for 
documenting and storing incoming and outgoing radiotelegrams, and 
the procedures employed for transmitting and receiving the 
radiotelegrams.  See R. app. at 653-55, 668-69. 
 As we have noted, the 12 radiotelegrams originating in 
Annapolis incorporate messages provided originally by Reilly and 
the radiotelegram from Berbillis incorporates a message which 
Reilly authorized Berbillis to send.  Moreover, all 13 of these 
radiotelegrams incorporate the Morse code transmissions by 
coastal station operators.  Under Rule 803(6), any statement 
incorporated into a business record must be verified by the party 
recording the statement, made by a party under "a duty to 
report," or admissible pursuant to another exception to the 
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hearsay rule.  See Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: 
Federal Rules of Evidence § 6757, at 641-43; Console, 13 F.3d at 
657-58; Fed. R. Evid. 805.  As we have indicated, the statements 
by Reilly were admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(A), and the 
statements by Berbillis and the coastal station operators were 
admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(C).   
 Thus, the district court did not err in admitting the 
12 incoming radiotelegrams sent by Reilly or the radiotelegram 
sent by Berbillis, as each of the three "statements" reflected in 
these radiotelegrams was not hearsay or was admissible under an 
exception to the hearsay rule.  Although the district court may 
have erred in admitting the other four incoming radiotelegrams 
into evidence, see R. App. at 1201, 1202, 1226, 1228, as we 
indicated above, such an error would be harmless.  
 Moreover, the district court also did not err by 
admitting the 18 outgoing radiotelegrams into evidence.  The 
outgoing radiotelegrams consist of two "statements": (1) 
Fuentes's statement to Carcamo, and (2) Carcamo's documenting of 
the statement.  Fuentes's statements were admissible pursuant to 
Rule 801(d)(1) which provides that a statement is not hearsay if 
[t]he declarant testifies . . . and is 
subject to cross-examination concerning the 
statement, and the statement is . . . (B) 
consistent with his testimony and is offered 
to rebut an express or implied charge against 
the declarant of recent fabrication or 
improper influence or motive. 
As the government points out, the defendants suggested to the 
jury that Fuentes had ulterior motives for cooperating with the 
government and was fabricating testimony to protect himself.  See 
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U.S. app. at 82-90A.  Thus, Fuentes's statements in the 
radiotelegrams were admissible to rebut these suggestions.   
 The second "statement" reflected in the outgoing 
radiotelegrams, Carcamo's documenting of Fuentes's statements, 
was admissible pursuant to Rule 803(6).  As we discussed above, 
Carcamo testified to the four foundation requirements of Rule 
803(6).  Specifically with regard to the outgoing radiotelegrams, 
Carcamo testified that he typed copies of the handwritten 
messages Fuentes asked him to send, and then sent a copy to Sait 
Electronics and retained one for the ship's records.  See R. app. 
at 866.  Again, Fuentes's testimony corroborated Caracamo's.  Id. 
at 653-55.   
 Thus, neither the 13 incoming radiotelegrams which the 
evidence links to Reilly nor the 18 outgoing radiotelegrams 
constituted inadmissible hearsay, and the admission of the four 
incoming radiotelegrams not linked to Reilly was harmless.  
 
 C. Were the questions posed to Reilly too ambiguous to 
    allow his response to form the basis of a false                    
declarations conviction? 
 At the contempt hearing held on December 15, 1988, in 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Reilly was asked, under 
oath, whether he had "any knowledge . . . as to what happened to 
the incinerator residue" on board the Khian Sea, or "any 
knowledge as to the means by which it might be ascertained what 
happened to the residue."  See U.S. app. at 275.  Reilly 
responded "[n]o, sir" to both questions.  Id. 
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 In January 1990, Reilly voluntarily appeared before a 
federal grand jury for the District of Delaware that was 
investigating potential ocean dumping violations in connection 
with the activities of the Khian Sea between September 1986 and 
December 1988.  Id. at 285-403.  Reilly was informed that the 
grand jury was investigating the disposal of ash from the Khian 
Sea and was advised of his right to leave and seek legal counsel. 
See U.S. app. at 288.  He then testified that he had not directed 
anyone to remove the ash from the ship, id. at 377-78, and that 
he had no knowledge of what happened to the ash, id. at 380-81.  
 On the basis of this testimony, Reilly was indicted in 
two counts for knowingly making false material declarations.  18 
U.S.C. § 1623(a).  Prior to trial, Reilly challenged the Delaware 
indictment alleging that the questions he was asked before the 
grand jury were too vague and ambiguous to support a conviction 
under section 1623(a).  The district court rejected this 
argument.  See United States v. Reilly, 811 F. Supp. at 180. 
However, Reilly now contends that both questions asked before the 
Delaware grand jury and questions posed at the contempt hearing 
held in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania were too vague and 
ambiguous to support his false declarations convictions.  See R. 
br. at 49-56.  We disagree.      
 First, Reilly claims that the following question posed 
before the grand jury was too vague and ambiguous: "What happened 
to the ash?".  According to Reilly, "[t]here was nothing about 
the context within which 'What happened to the ash?' was asked 
that signified that the questioner did not care where, in any 
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specific sense, the ash was off-loaded, but instead was concerned 
only with whether it was disposed of somewhere -- anywhere -- in 
the ocean."  Id. at 52.  We reject Reilly's suggestion that 
because he thought he was being asked exactly "[w]here in the 
ocean" the ash was off-loaded he was not testifying falsely by 
stating that he did not know what happened to the ash.  There is 
no doubt that the question "[w]hat happened to the ash?" was 
sufficiently precise to support Reilly's false declaration 
conviction.  A person who knows that the ash was dumped in the 
ocean knows what happened to the ash.  The grand jury, after all, 
did not ask him where it was dumped.  Moreover, we reject 
Reilly's argument that the grand jury's question, "[d]id you 
direct anyone to take anything off that ship after it left 
Yugoslavia?", see U.S. app. at 377-78, was vague due to the use 
of the term "direct" and the placement of the modifier "after it 
left Yugoslavia."        
 We also find that the questions posed in the district 
court contempt proceeding regarding Reilly's "knowledge" were 
sufficiently precise.  Reilly was asked: "[d]o you have any 
knowledge . . . as to what happened to the incinerator residue on 
board the vessel?" and "[d]o you have any knowledge as to the 
means by which it might be ascertained what happened to the 
residue on board the vessel?".  See id. at 237.  We do not 
believe that in the context of the questions, the term 
"'knowledge,' without further definition, is inherently 
ambiguous."  See R. br. at 54 (citing United States v. Cook, 497 
F.2d 753, 764 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1972) (dissenting opinion), 
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majority opinion withdrawn and dissenting opinion reinstated on 
rehearing as majority position in relevant part, 489 F.2d 286 
(9th Cir. 1973)).   
   Reilly cites Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 
361-62, 93 S.Ct. 595, 601-02 (1973), in support of his argument 
that the questions underlying his false declaration convictions 
were excessively vague.  However, Bronston is distinguishable 
because, as we noted in United States v. Slawik, 548 F.2d 75, 86 
(3d Cir. 1977), "Bronston involved literally true but misleading 
answers."  In Bronston, 409 U.S. at 361-62, 93 S.Ct. at 601-02, 
the Supreme Court held that the perjury statute, 18 U.S.C. §1621, 
does not apply to statements that are literally true, even if 
these statements create an implication which is false.  The 
Supreme Court's reasoning in Bronston applies equally to the 
false declarations statute, section 1623.  See Slawik, 548 F.2d 
at 83 (To violate 18 U.S.C. § 1623, testimony must be "both false 
and material.  If literally true, there was no offense, even if . 
. . [the defendant's] answer was deliberately misleading.") 
(citing Bronston, 409 U.S. 352, 93 S.Ct. 595 (1973)).  However, 
this case bears no resemblance to Bronston. 
 Bronston involved a perjury prosecution arising from a 
bankruptcy hearing at which one of the defendant's creditors 
asked him whether he had ever had a Swiss bank account, and the 
defendant responded by stating that his company once had a Swiss 
bank account for six months.  Id. at 354, 93 S.Ct. at 598. Though 
the defendant's answer was unresponsive and created the false 
implication that he had never had a Swiss bank account, his 
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literal statement regarding his company's Swiss bank account was 
true.  Id.  Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that he could 
not be convicted of perjury as Congress did not intend to 
criminalize "answers unresponsive on their face but untrue only 
by 'negative implication.'"  Id. at 361, 93 S.Ct. at 601.   
 We cannot classify Reilly's responses in the district 
court or to the grand jury as "literally true."  Moreover, we 
have "eschew[ed] a broad reading of Bronston," id., and held that 
[a]s a general rule, the fact that there is some ambiguity in a 
falsely answered question will not shield the respondent from a 
perjury or false statements prosecution. . . . Normally, it is 
for the petit jury to decide which construction the defendant 
placed on the question. . . .  It is difficult to define the 
point at which a question becomes so ambiguous that it is not 
amenable to jury interpretation.  We have stated that the point 
is reached 'when it [is] entirely unreasonable to expect that the 
defendant understood the question posed to him.' Slawik, 548 F.2d 
at 86.  Other courts have said that '[a] question is 
fundamentally ambiguous when it "is not a phrase with a meaning 
about which men of ordinary intellect could agree, nor one which 
could be used with mutual understanding by a questioner and 
answerer unless it were defined at the time it were sought and 
offered as testimony."'   
 
United States v. Ryan, 828 F.2d 1010, 1015 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(quoting United States v. Lighte, 782 F.2d 367, 375 (2d Cir. 
1986)) (some internal citations omitted).  Under either 
construction of the Bronston standard for ambiguity, it is clear 
that the questions posed to Reilly were not so ambiguous that 
they were no longer amenable to jury interpretation. 
 
 D. Did Reilly's false declarations 
indictment    adequately allege the falsity 
of Reilly's     responses to the grand jury 
and the           district court? 
 Reilly argues that the indictments on which his false 
declaration convictions were based were defective because they 
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failed to allege adequately the falsity of his responses to the 
district court and the grand jury.  See R. br. at 56-60.  We have 
held that "a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1623 may not stand 
where the indictment fails to set forth the precise falsehood 
alleged and the factual basis of its falsity with sufficient 
clarity to permit a jury to determine its verity and to allow 
meaningful judicial review of the materiality of those 
falsehoods."  Slawik, 548 F.2d at 83.  It is undisputed that the 
Delaware indictment alleged that Reilly's responses to the grand 
jury were false because he knew the ash on board the Khian Sea 
had been dumped into the water in and around the Indian Ocean. 
See R. br. at 57-58.  On this basis, the district court held that 
the Delaware indictment adequately alleged the falsity of 
Reilly's statements.  Reilly, 811 F. Supp. at 179.  The 
Pennsylvania indictment alleged that Reilly's responses to the 
district court were false because he knew the ash on board the 
Khian Sea had been dumped into the water in and around the 
Atlantic Ocean and Indian Ocean.  We conclude that both the 
Delaware indictment and the Pennsylvania indictment adequately 
alleged the falsity of Reilly's statements.  See R. br. at 57-58. 
 Reilly analogizes this case to United States v. 
Tonelli, 577 F.2d 194, 198 (3d Cir. 1978), in which we held that 
a false declarations indictment is defective when it "fails to 
specify in what particular the defendant's reply was false." 
However, Tonelli is distinguishable.  In Tonelli, the indictment 
alleged that the defendant made a false declaration when he 
denied having participated in placing certain pension fund monies 
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in certificates of deposit.  Tonelli, 577 F.2d at 197.  Although 
the "defendant's initial denial of involvement, standing alone, 
was not true, . . . when the prosecutor subsequently defined 
'participation in the placement of . . . monies . . . for the 
purchase' as including a recommendation [to use a particular 
bank, the defendant] . . . answered truthfully."  Id. at 198. 
Thus, at least one of the defendant's responses to the question 
was "literally true."  Moreover, the indictment quoted only the 
first, more general question, "ignoring the qualifying 
definitions [subsequently] used by the prosecutor," and therefore 
it was "misleading."  Id.    
 By identifying Reilly's responses that he had no idea 
what happened to the ash or how it might be ascertained what 
happened to the ash and alleging that Reilly knew the ash had 
been dumped into the ocean, the indictments in this case, unlike 
the indictment in Tonelli, "set forth the precise falsehood[s] 
alleged and the factual basis of . . . [their] falsity with 
sufficient clarity to permit a jury to determine . . . [their] 
verity and to allow meaningful judicial review of the materiality 
of those falsehoods."  Slawik, 548 F.2d at 83.  The indictment 
also alleged that Reilly responded falsely when he denied having 
directed the dumping of the ash from the Khian Sea, and as the 
government concedes, "there was no specific averment in the . . . 
Wilmington indictment that Reilly had in fact directed the 
dumping."  See U.S. br. at 49.  However, unlike the questions in 
Tonelli, the grand jury's question regarding whether Reilly 
directed the dumping of ash was quite precise and was not 
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excerpted in the indictment in a misleading manner.  Moreover, we 
see no evidence that Reilly's response to this question or any of 
the other related questions was "literally true."  Thus, in the 
circumstances, the indictment in this case, unlike the indictment 
in Tonelli, adequately specified "in what particular the 
defendant's reply was false."  Tonelli, 577 F.2d at 198.        
 
 E. Was the question posed to Dowd too ambiguous to                   
allow his response to form the basis of a false                   
declarations conviction? 
 Dowd appeared before a federal grand jury for the 
District of Delaware on February 14, 1990.  See U.S. app. at 405-
95.  Based on his testimony before the grand jury, Dowd was 
charged with one count of knowingly making a false declaration 
under oath.  While this count alleged that Dowd knowingly made 
three false declarations before the grand jury, the district 
court instructed the jury that a conviction required proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt that Dowd knowingly made only one false 
declaration.  See U.S. app. at 231.  The indictment listed the 
following three questions and allegedly false declarations: 
 A GRAND JUROR:  Do you know what 
happened to the ash? 
 THE WITNESS:  No. 
 A GRAND JUROR:  You have no idea? 
 THE WITNESS:  No, I don't.  I honestly 
have not been on that ship for two and a half 
years. 
   . . .  
  
 A GRAND JUROR:  . . . [y]ou didn't ask 
where it went?  You didn't want to know where 
it went? 
 THE WITNESS:  No, I didn't ask, and I 
don't know.  All right?  Nor did he tell me. 
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See D. app. at 212-13.   
 The jury's answers to special interrogatories indicate 
that it found Dowd guilty only of making a knowingly false 
declaration in response to the question "You have no idea?"  See 
U.S. app. at 234-35.  The jury did not return a verdict with 
respect to Dowd's response to the question "[d]o you know what 
happened to the ash?" and found Dowd "not guilty" of violating 18 
U.S.C. § 1623(a) based on his response to the question "[y]ou 
didn't ask where it went?  You didn't want to know where it 
went?".  Like Reilly, Dowd asserts that his statement was made in 
response to a question that was too ambiguous to support his 
conviction for making a false declaration.  The district court 
rejected this argument and so do we.  See Reilly, 811 F. Supp. at 
181. 
 As the government argues, viewed in context, the 
question posed to Dowd was "you have no idea [what happened to 
the ash]?"  See U.S. br. at 51.  Dowd concedes that the question 
"could reasonably be interpreted simply as a restatement of the 
preceding question," and that "[u]nder this interpretation, the 
question essentially asked . . . '[a]re you certain you do not 
know what happened to the ash?"  See D. br. at 19.  However, Dowd 
contends that the question also could be construed to call for 
"intelligent speculation," id. at 22, that the jury's responses 
to the special interrogatories confirm that this was the 
construction it adopted, id. at 20.  He further argues that a 
"jury is not free to attempt to decipher which of two meanings to 
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accept," id. at 21 (citing United States v. Manapat, 928 F.2d 
1097, 1101 (11th Cir. 1991)). 
 We conclude that the question was not "fundamentally 
ambiguous."  First, a jury is generally free to determine the 
meaning the defendant ascribed to a question.  As we noted above, 
when there is "some ambiguity[,] . . . [n]ormally, it is for the 
petit jury to decide which construction the defendant placed on 
the question."  United States v. Ryan, 828 F.2d at 1015.  The 
question posed to Dowd, like those posed to Reilly, "is not so 
ambiguous that it is not amenable to jury interpretation" because 
it is reasonable "'to expect that the defendant understood the 
question.'"  Id. (quoting Slawik, 548 F.2d at 86).  The 
prosecutor expressly instructed Dowd that the questions were 
intended to determine what he knew, and that if he didn't know 
something, he should "just say . . . [I] don't know."  See U.S. 
app. at 439; see also id. at 446 ("[i]f you don't know something, 
tell us you don't know").  Moreover, Dowd's responses indicate 
that he was aware that he should respond based on his own 
knowledge, and that he should define his own "knowledge" to 
include information obtained from speaking to others.0  See e.g., 
id. at 453 ("[t]o my knowledge, no"), 478-80 ("A.  . . . The 
repair work done in Singapore, in Yugoslavia, wasn't complete 
                     
0The dissent contends that the question "You have no idea?" was 
"fatally ambiguous" because it "is so fundamentally ambiguous 
that it would be entirely unreasonable to expect that [Dowd] 
understood it."  Dissent typescript at 23.  As we stated above, 
we conclude that the question posed to Dowd was not "fatally 
ambiguous" because it is reasonable "'to expect that the 
defendant understood the question.'"  United States v. Ryan, 828 
F.2d at 1015 (citation omitted).   
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because the vessel could not complete its survey . . . [b]ecause 
there was ash in the cargo. . . . A GRAND JUROR:  Did you just 
say when the ship got to Yugoslavia it still had the ash on it? 
THE WITNESS:  I wasn't there.  I was told that.  Okay. Yes.").   
 Second, Dowd's reliance on the jury's responses to the 
special interrogatories is inappropriate.  The jury's responses 
to the special interrogatories are immaterial to our inquiry 
because the jury was not required to make a finding regarding 
more than one of Dowd's three allegedly false responses, and it 
did not make a finding regarding Dowd's response to the first of 
the three questions identified in the false statements count. 
Moreover, as we pointed out in United States v. Vastola, 899 F.2d 
211, 225 (3d Cir.), cert. granted and judgment vacated on other 
grounds, 497 U.S. 1001, 110 S.Ct. 3233 (1990), principles of 
estoppel do not require the verdict rendered at a single trial to 
be consistent.  Thus, we conclude that the question on which 
Dowd's conviction rests was not too ambiguous to support it. 
  
 F. Was Dowd's response "material"? 
 Dowd argues that his conviction under the false 
declarations statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1623, should be reversed 
because the government failed to establish that his testimony was 
"material" to the grand jury's investigation.  We agree with the 
district court's conclusion that this argument lacks merit.  See 
Reilly, 811 F. Supp. at 180-81.  Section 1623 provides in 
relevant part that 
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 (a) [w]hoever under oath . . . in any 
proceeding before or ancillary to any court 
or grand jury of the United States knowingly 
makes any false material declaration or makes 
or uses any other information, including any 
book, paper, document, record, recording, or 
other material, knowing the same to contain 
any false material declaration, shall be 
fined not more than $ 10,000 or imprisoned 
not more than five years or both. 
Thus, "under the false declarations statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1623, 
materiality is an essential element of the offense and a question 
of law reserved for decision by the court."  United States v. 
Crocker, 568 F.2d 1049, 1056 (3d Cir. 1977) (citing Slawik, 548 
F.2d at 75, 83).  "It is well established that a perjurious 
statement is material . . . if it has a tendency to influence, 
impede, or hamper the grand jury from pursuing its 
investigation."  United States v. Lardieri, 497 F.2d 317, 319 (3d 
Cir. 1974), on rehearing, 506 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1974).  Moreover, 
"leads to additional facts may be material even though they do 
not directly reflect on the ultimate issue being investigated." 
497 F.2d at 319.0  We apply a plenary standard of review to 
                     
0See also Crocker, 568 F.2d at 1057 ("it suffices to establish 
that testimony . . ., if false, [would] tend to impede an 
investigation"); United States v. Phillips, 674 F. Supp. 1144, 
1148 (E.D. Pa. 1987) ("A question asked of a grand jury witness 
is material if it 'is such that a truthful answer could help the 
inquiry, or a false response hinder it, and these effects are 
weighed in terms of potentiality rather than probability. . . . 
It is of no consequence that the information sought would be 
merely cumulative, that the response was believed by the grand 
jury to be perjurious at the time it was uttered, or that the 
matters inquired into were collateral to the principal objective 
of the grand jury.'") (emphasis in original) (quoting United 
States v. Berardi, 629 F.2d 723, 728 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 
U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534 (1980)); United States v. Schiavo, 375 F. 
Supp. 475, 477 (E.D. Pa.) ("False testimony is material if it has 
a natural tendency to influence the grand jury in its 
investigation, and there is no need to prove the perjured 
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determine whether Dowd's testimony was material as a matter of 
law.  Slawik, 548 F.2d at 83. 
 According to Dowd, the government failed to satisfy the 
materiality requirement because the question posed to Dowd could 
be construed in one of two ways: (1) as a restatement of the 
previous question calling for knowledge that was material to the 
grand jury's investigation or (2) as a distinct question calling 
for intelligent speculation, which was not material to the grand 
jury's investigation.  See D. br. at 24-27.  Dowd analogizes this 
case to Slawik, and argues that Slawik requires us to hold that 
the government failed to satisfy the materiality requirement. 
However, this case is distinguishable from Slawik.    
 In Slawik, the defendant testified that he had given 
the following advice to an associate subpoenaed to testify before 
a grand jury: 
Look Barney [sic] you will probably only be 
there a day.  Get yourself legal counsel, 
tell them the truth.  They are not going to 
hold you.  You can go back to Florida. 
Slawik, 548 F.2d at 82.  The court held that the defendant's 
conviction under section 1623 must be reversed because "[n]either 
the indictment nor the bill of particulars set[] forth the grand 
jury's understanding of . . . [the underlined] words," and thus 
the court could not determine "whether the trial jury found that 
                                                                  
testimony actually impeded the jury's work.  The false testimony 
need not be directed to the primary subject of the investigation, 
it is material if it is relevant to any subsidiary issue under 
consideration by the tribunal.") (citing United States v. Lococo, 
450 F.2d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 945, 
92 S.Ct. 2040 (1972)), aff'd, 506 F.2d 1053 (3d Cir. 1974) 
(table). 
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. . . [the defendant] had failed actually to advise . . . [his 
associate]: (1) to tell counsel the truth, or (2) to tell the 
grand jury the truth."  Id. at 83.  Only the latter construction 
would have rendered the alleged falsehood "material," and "the 
imprecision of the allegations contained in the indictment and 
bill of particulars render[ed] meaningful review of materiality 
impossible."  Id.   
 This case is distinguishable from Slawik because the 
indictment here set forth the meaning of Dowd's responses by 
specifying that Dowd's responses "were false in that . . . [he,] 
then and there well knew that the incinerator ash on board the 
Khian Sea had been discharged, disposed of and off loaded from 
the Khian Sea by dumping the incinerator ash into the water in 
and around the Indian Ocean."  See D. app. at 31.  Thus, the 
indictment did not permit the construction of the question "[y]ou 
have no idea [what happened to the ash]?" as a question that 
called for "intelligent speculation."  Instead, the indictment 
indicated that the question was merely a restatement of the 
previous question regarding Dowd's "knowledge" of "what happened 
to the ash," and, as Dowd concedes, this question and Dowd's 
response to it were material to the grand jury's investigation.  
 
 G. Did the evidence support Dowd's false declaration                 
conviction? 
 Dowd also argues that if we construe the question 
"[y]ou have no idea?" to mean "are you certain you do not know 
what happened to the ash?", his conviction cannot stand because 
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there was insufficient evidence indicating that he "actually knew 
'what happened to the ash.'"  See D. br. at 28.  Thus, Dowd 
claims that there was insufficient evidence of the falsity of his 
statement to sustain his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1623. 
According to Dowd, Fuentes's testimony regarding whether he 
discussed the disposal of the ash with Dowd was self-
contradictory.  Id. at 29-31.  Dowd also argues that Fuentes's 
testimony regarding Dowd's instructions to tell inquiring 
journalists that the ash had been left in a country whose 
identity could not be revealed and to create a false log of the 
route taken by the Khian Sea does not prove that Dowd knew the 
ash had been dumped in the ocean.  Id. at 31-34. 
 "We review challenges to the sufficiency of the 
evidence presented at trial by ascertaining whether, viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a 
reasonable mind could find the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt of every element of the offense."  United States 
v. Terselich, 885 F.2d 1094, 1097 (3d Cir. 1989).  Here we 
conclude, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
government, that a jury could have found beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Dowd's statement that he had no idea what happened to 
the ash was false. 
 We base our holding on several grounds.  First, 
Fuentes's testimony was not inherently self-contradictory.  He 
testified on direct that he asked Dowd "what would be happening 
now that we have dumped the ash to the ocean and if the 
journalist will be still making questions around the cargo."  See 
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D. app. at 320.  He then reiterated during his cross-examination 
that when Dowd boarded the ship in Singapore, "I asked him, 
[n]ow, what we will do, what we will do now that we have dumped 
the ash in the ocean?".  See U.S. app. at 95.  It is true that 
Fuentes admitted having told a private investigator that he did 
not "tell . . . [Dowd] straight that, hey, we did . . . [the 
dumping] because he already knew."  See D. app. at 334.  However, 
as the government points out, the jury reasonably could have 
found that Fuentes's earlier statement was not in conflict with 
his trial testimony because "Fuentes mentioned the dumping to 
Dowd only as a predicate for obtaining instructions about what to 
tell the press.  This may have been what Fuentes meant when he 
told the investigator that he had not told Dowd 'straight' about 
the dumping."  See U.S. br. at 58-59.  Moreover, Fuentes 
clarified what he had said to the private investigator about his 
conversation with Dowd by stating "[w]e [he and Dowd] discuss it, 
we talk about it, but I did not make the straight question."  See 
D. app. at 334.  Thus, we cannot conclude that as a matter of 
law, Fuentes's testimony was self-contradictory or that he 
retracted his earlier testimony about having discussed the 
dumping with Dowd. 
 Second, Fuentes's other testimony regarding Dowd 
supported the jury's finding that Dowd knew about the dumping. We 
conclude that, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
government, Fuentes's testimony that Dowd boarded the ship in 
Singapore to "pickup the gear that we had been using to discharge 
the ship," id. at 319-20, and instructed him to tell journalists 
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that the ash had been discharged in an unidentified country 
pursuant to an agreement, see U.S. app. at 95, D. app. at 320, 
and to create a false logbook documenting "another route other 
than the one we have been," see id. at 324-25, is sufficient to 
support the jury's finding that Dowd knew the ash had been dumped 
in the ocean.   
 Finally, there was evidence indicating that, as 
president of Coastal Carriers, Dowd played an active role in the 
affairs of the Khian Sea from the moment the ash was loaded, and 
this evidence also supports the conclusion that Dowd knew about 
the dumping.  Dowd was present when the ash was first loaded onto 
the Khian Sea, see U.S. app. at 124, knew some of it was  
off-loaded in Haiti, id. at 125, searched for possible sites to 
discharge the remaining ash, id. at 118-19, met the ship in 
Singapore where it was to be reclassified inasmuch as its holds 
no longer contained any ash, and communicated with Reilly from 
Singapore, id. at 126.  Overall, the evidence of the falsity of 
Dowd's statement that he had "no idea" what happened to the ash 
is more than sufficient to sustain his conviction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1623.   
 
 H. Did the prosecutor improperly offer his opinion and 
    unsworn testimony during his closing argument? 
 Dowd and Reilly argue that the prosecutor prejudiced 
them in his closing argument by referring to their testimony as 
"lies," and by misstating the record in several respects.  See D. 
br. at 34-37; R. br. at 60-69.  Dowd and Reilly unsuccessfully 
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raised their arguments regarding the impropriety of the 
prosecutor's closing argument in motions for new trials.  See D. 
app. at 42-43.  Like the district court, we reject their 
arguments. 
 While it is true that the prosecutor referred to Dowd's 
and Reilly's testimony as "lies," in making this characterization 
he was not guilty of misconduct because he merely was making a 
"fair comment on the evidence adduced at trial."  United States 
v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1127 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 
111 S.Ct. 2009 (1991).  Thus, although such a comment may in some 
instances be an inflammatory expression of a prosecutor's 
personal belief and require reversal, here it does not. 
Furthermore, the prosecutor's characterization of Dowd's and 
Reilly's testimony as lies referred to their statements at the 
grand jury and contempt proceedings, and when a prosecutor 
contends that a defendant in a false declaration case lied in the 
underlying proceedings, he merely is arguing that the evidence 
supports a verdict of guilty.   
 Dowd and Reilly also claim that the prosecutor made 
other improper statements during his closing argument.  According 
to Dowd, the prosecutor's "most devastating" misstatement of the 
record was his assertion that Dowd played a role in ordering 
Fuentes to destroy the radiotelegrams.  D. br. at 35.  However, 
Dowd did not object to this statement at trial and therefore "we 
may review only for plain error."  Pungitore, 910 F.2d at 1125-
26.   As we discussed above, there was substantial evidence 
indicating that Dowd knew about the dumping of the ash into the 
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ocean, and Fuentes testified that Dowd instructed him to falsify 
the ship's logs.  Although Fuentes testified that Reilly ordered 
him to destroy the radiotelegrams, see D. app. at 327, 348, he 
also testified that "[t]he owners didn't want them on board. . . 
. They didn't want them on board," see U.S. app. at 97 (emphasis 
added).  Moreover, the evidence indicates that Dowd and Reilly 
were in contact while Dowd was in Singapore.  Thus, there was a 
basis for the inference that Dowd participated in the decision to 
have Fuentes destroy the radiotelegrams.  In any event, even if 
the statement should not have been made, we see no basis to 
conclude that it gives rise to a supportable claim of "plain 
error" in light of the record as a whole.  We also point out that 
the district court's instruction to the jury to rely on their 
recollection of the facts and not counsel's statements and 
arguments cured any possible prejudice resulting from the 
comment.  In fact, the prosecutor said the same thing to the jury 
in his summation.  Accordingly, we conclude that we should not 
reverse by reason of the prosecutor's statement that Dowd and 
Reilly ordered Fuentes to destroy the radiotelegrams. 
 Dowd and Reilly argue that the prosecutor misstated the 
evidence by suggesting that they personally had destroyed 
documents.  Specifically, they challenge the prosecutor's 
contention that they destroyed their copies of radiotelegrams 
associated with the Khian Sea.  See D. app. at 475.  However, 
this contention was supported by evidence, including a letter 
from Coastal Carriers to the grand jury stating that "no radio 
logs or other logs" were in Coastal Carriers's possession, see R. 
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app. at 1264, and Fuente's testimony regarding the instructions 
he received to falsify the ship's log and destroy the 
radiotelegrams.  Thus, the prosecutor merely was drawing an 
inference from certain pieces of evidence in the record.   
 Reilly also argues that the prosecutor "testified" 
based on non-record evidence by using the pronoun "we" when 
discussing Reilly's allegedly false testimony, by referring to 
Amalgamated and MASCO as "shells" for Reilly and Dowd, and by 
stating that the defendants had not called any witnesses from the 
radio transmitting companies because the radiotelegrams were 
"accurate."  R. br. at 63-65.  Reilly cites United States v. 
DiLoreto, 888 F.2d 996, 999 (3d Cir. 1989), for the proposition 
that these remarks "require reversal per se."  In DiLoreto, we 
held that "a prosecutor's remarks regarding the defendant's guilt 
or a witness' credibility, if based on information not adduced at 
trial, require reversal per se."  Id. at 999.  We conclude that 
DiLoreto does not require reversal per se in this case. 
 The prosecutor used the pronoun "we" when arguing that 
the questions posed to the defendants were clear.  He stated, 
[y]ou know what those words meant because 
they are words that are used in ordinary 
conversation. . . .  Everybody knew what we 
were talking about.  Everybody knew what they 
were talking about in that hearing in 
Philadelphia.  They were talking about the 
ash on board the Khian Sea. 
See R. app. at 1105.  The prosecutor who made this statement also 
presented the matter to the grand jury in Delaware when Reilly 
and Dowd testified.  Prior to trial, they sought to disqualify 
the prosecutor, based in part on the contention that he would be 
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an unsworn witness at trial.  The district court, however, 
refused to disqualify him, stating that it assumed the prosecutor 
would be "very careful in the presentation of the Government's 
case."  United States v. Reilly, Crim. Nos. 92-53-JJF, 93-8-JJF, 
93-10-JJF, Memorandum Opinion at 9 (D. Del. May 7, 1993) (see R. 
app. at 109).  Although the prosecutor's choice of words was 
unfortunate, the prosecutor's isolated use of the pronoun "we" 
did not constitute testimony based on evidence not adduced at 
trial.  He did not say "we" or "I" knew what the defendant was 
talking about.  He said "[e]verybody" knew what "we" were talking 
about.  Consequently, the remark was merely an inference from 
evidence in the record, and thus does not require reversal per 
se.  See DiLoreto, 888 F.2d at 999; Government of Virgin Islands 
v. Joseph, 770 F.2d 343, 349 (3d Cir. 1985).  Furthermore, 
reviewing the matter to determine if there was prejudice from the 
prosecutor's use of words, we conclude that "[u]nder the 
circumstances and in light of the strong evidence of guilt . . . 
, we believe . . . [the court's] instructions adequately cured 
any prejudice that may have arisen."  Joseph, id. at 349. 
 Reilly also faults the prosecutor for referring to 
Amalgamated and MASCO as "shells" used by Reilly and Dowd to 
conceal their involvement with the dumping operation of the Khian 
Sea, see R. app. at 1088, 1115-16.  However, the record also 
supports this statement.  As noted above, there is significant 
evidence indicating that Reilly sent radiotelegrams from 
Annapolis signed "AMALGAMATED" or "MASCO".  Moreover, Cheryl 
Haye, a secretary for MASCO, testified that MASCO set up and 
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managed businesses, that she did not know of any MASCO office in 
Annapolis, id. at 525, that MASCO and Amalgamated shared the same 
post office box in the Bahamas, id. at 532, that there was no 
physical separation between Lily and MASCO inside the MASCO 
offices, id. at 527, that she signed a letter as president of 
Lily although she was actually a secretary for MASCO, id. at 534, 
and that she regularly would sign letters as president of 
corporations created by MASCO although she knew nothing about the 
companies, id. at 538-39.  Clare Dobbins, a secretary in the 
Coastal Carriers office in Annapolis, testified that there was 
Lily letterhead in the Coastal Carriers office, see U.S. app. at 
21, and that the check books for Coastal Carriers, Amalgamated, 
and the Coastal Barge Corporation were kept in the Coastal 
Carriers office.  Id. at 22.  Thus, we agree with the 
government's contention that "[i]t was proper to argue, based on 
this evidence, that the jury . . . should disregard the form of 
these different corporations and look instead to the substance of 
who was doing what."  See U.S. br. at 70. 
 Finally, Reilly argues that the prosecutor stated that 
the defendants had not called any witnesses from the radio 
transmitting companies because the radiotelegrams were 
"accurate," and that this statement requires reversal of Reilly's 
conviction because it was based on evidence outside the record. 
After the jury was excused, the defendants objected to this 
statement.  See U.S. app. at 216-19.  At this point, the district 
court suggested that the parties stipulate that the cable 
companies did not have the required information to verify the 
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accuracy of the radiotelegrams.  Id. at 219-21.  The parties 
agreed on the stipulation, and the district court read it to the 
jury, id. at 221, 224-25.  The defendants did not raise any 
further objection or seek further clarification.  Id. at 225. 
Therefore, "[i]nasmuch as appellants did not object to the 
curative instruction or request additional instructions, they 
apparently were satisfied with the district court's response and 
cannot now complain that [the prosecutor's] comments gave rise to 
reversible error."  Pungitore, 910 F.2d at 1128.  
 
 I. Is the district court's refusal to grant Dowd a                   
downward departure under the sentencing guidelines                
reviewable by this court, and if so, did the                      
district court err in refusing to grant the                       
departure? 
 Dowd sought a downward departure from the sentence 
range calculated under the Sentencing Guidelines.  Pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(b), Dowd argued that the court should depart 
downward because in his case, "there exist[] . . . aggravating or 
mitigating circumstances of a kind, or to a degree, not 
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing 
Commission."  Dowd argues that his false declarations prosecution 
was "atypical" because "he had nothing whatsoever to do with the 
underlying ocean dumping offense," and his "actual false 
statement itself is hopelessly technical in nature, arising as it 
does from the open-ended, ambiguous question 'You have no idea?'" 
See D. br. at 40.  Dowd also argues that a downward departure was 
warranted because his conviction "may well result in the 
suspension and debarment from all future government contracts not 
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only of Dowd personally but also of the various businesses owned 
by his entire family."  Id. at 41. 
 In United States v. Denardi, 892 F.2d 269, 272 (3d Cir. 
1989), we held that "we have no jurisdiction to review a district 
court's discretionary decision not to depart from the 
Guidelines."  United States v. Bierley, 922 F.2d 1061, 1066 (3d 
Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. Denardi, 892 F.2d at 272). 
"However, we recognized in Denardi that when the district court's 
decision not to depart is predicated on the legally erroneous 
impression that it did not have the authority to do so, we may 
review that decision."  Bierley, 922 F.2d at 1066.  We believe 
that the district court denied Dowd a downward departure because 
it concluded that the Guidelines did not authorize it to depart. 
See D. app. at 505-06.  Thus, we have jurisdiction to review the 
district court's decision, and based on our review, we conclude 
that its decision was correct.   
 Even if it is true that Dowd "had nothing whatsoever to 
do with the underlying ocean dumping offense," this fact alone 
does not establish that Dowd's false statement "differs from the 
norm."  See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, Ch. 1, Pt. A, note 4(b), 
at 5-6 (1993).  As the government points out, Application Note 3 
to Guidelines § 2J1.3 specifically addresses the situation where 
the defendant is convicted both for perjury and the "offense with 
respect to which he committed perjury," indicating that the 
Commission did not consider a conviction for perjury absent a 
conviction for an underlying offense to be "atypical."  Further, 
we do not believe that his false statement was particularly 
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"technical in nature," or that it arose from an ambiguous 
question.   
 Finally, the district court was correct in concluding 
that the conviction's potentially harmful financial consequences 
for Dowd, his family, and their businesses did not justify a 
downward departure from the Guidelines.  The Sentencing 
Commission's policy statement regarding the propriety of granting 
a downward departure based on a defendant's "vocational skills" 
is controlling, Guidelines § 5H1.2,0 and this policy statement 
indicates that a sentencing court only should grant a downward 
departure on this basis in "extraordinary circumstances."  See 
United States v. Sharapan, 13 F.3d 781, 784 (3d Cir. 1994).  Our 
application of this policy statement in Sharapan led us to 
conclude that the district court erred in granting a downward 
departure based on its determination that the defendant's 
incarceration would cause his business to fail.  Id. at 785-86. 
We based our conclusion on our determination that there was 
nothing extraordinary in the fact that the incarceration of a 
company's principal might "cause harm to the business and its 
employees," and that, even assuming that the business would fail 
as a result of the defendant's incarceration, there was "no basis 
for concluding that this failure would cause any extraordinary 
harm to society as a whole."  Id. at 785.   
                     
0In Williams v. United States, 112 S.Ct. 1112, 1119 (1992), the 
Court held that where "a policy statement prohibits a district 
court from taking a specified action, the statement is an 
authoritative guide to the meaning of the applicable guideline."  
See also United States v. Gaskill, 991 F.2d 82, 85 (3d Cir. 
1993). 
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 Dowd alleges that his sentence will harm both his 
business and that of his family members.  Nevertheless, the 
Sentencing Commission's policy statement regarding downward 
departures based on a defendant's vocational skills is 
controlling because the "principle underlying . . . [this policy 
statement is] that a sentencing judge may grant a downward 
departure based on a defendant's ability to make a work-related 
contribution to society only in extraordinary circumstances," 
id., and it follows from this principle that a court may grant a 
downward departure based on a defendant's relatives' abilities to 
make work-related contributions to society only in extraordinary 
circumstances.  It is unfortunate that Dowd's family may suffer 
both personally and financially due to his conviction.  However, 
we see nothing extraordinary in the fact that Dowd's conviction 
may harm not only his business interests but also those of his 
family members, and we are not convinced that the effects of 
Dowd's sentence on these businesses "are of sufficient economic 
importance to society to justify a departure."  Id.0 
III. Conclusion 
 The judgments of conviction and sentence will be 
affirmed. 
                     
0The Sentencing Commission's policy statement regarding the 
relevance of family ties and responsibilities to the granting of 
a downward departure also supports our decision.  It provides 
that such factors are relevant only in "extraordinary" 
circumstances, Guidelines § 5H1.6, as "'[d]isruptions of the 
defendant's life, and the concomitant difficulties for those who 
depend on the defendant, are inherent in the punishment of 
incarceration.'"  United States v. Gaskill, 991 F.2d 82, 84-85 
(3d Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124, 
128 (2d Cir. 1992)). 
68 




















United States v. Reilly -- Nos. 93-7671, 93-7673, 93-7684, 
93-7685, 93-7686 
and 
United States v. Dowd -- No. 93-7694 
 
 
GARTH, J., dissenting 
 
 I am compelled to dissent from the majority opinion as 
(1) the record convinces me that Reilly is entitled to a new 
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trial on all charges, and (2) the record also requires that the 
false declaration charge against Dowd must be dismissed.  I am 
also disturbed with the evidentiary analysis by which the 
majority sustains Reilly's conviction.  That analysis, which in 
my opinion is seriously flawed, not only affects this appeal, 
but, because it will become the law of this circuit, it 
necessarily infects all future trial and appellate proceedings on 
which it may impact.  It is for these reasons -- more fully 
expressed below -- that I find it necessary to part company with 
my colleagues in the majority. 
 
I.  
 I am in accord with the majority that:  (1) there was 
no ambiguity in the predicate questions underlying Reilly's 
convictions for knowingly making false declarations in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a); (2) Reilly's false declaration 
indictments adequately alleged the falsity of his purportedly 
perjurious responses; and that (3) the disputed radiotelegrams 
admitted into evidence against Reilly were properly authenticated 
through circumstantial evidence.   
 I am not in accord, however, with the majority's 
analysis of the hearsay issues raised by Reilly.  For the reasons 
which I will discuss in the following section, I disagree with 
the majority's holding that 13 of the disputed radiotelegrams 
transmitted to the Khian Sea were admissible as non-hearsay 
admissions of Reilly.  In my opinion, the district court erred in 
admitting those radiotelegrams, and that error necessarily 
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undermined the entire trial process, thereby tainting Reilly's 
jury conviction on the ocean dumping violation (33 U.S.C. 
§1411(a)), as well as his false declaration convictions.  
Accordingly, rather than affirm Reilly's conviction, as the 
majority holds, I would reverse Reilly's conviction and remand 
his case to the district court for a new trial on all charges. 
 I also must disagree with the majority's affirmance of 
Dowd's conviction for knowingly making a false declaration before 
the federal grand jury in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a). 
Unlike the majority, I am not convinced that the predicate 
question posed to Dowd before the grand jury was unambiguous. 
Based on the inherent ambiguity of the question to which Dowd was 
found to have responded falsely, I would reverse his conviction, 
and I would remand to the district court for dismissal of the 
§1623(a) charge against Dowd.  My disposition would obviate the 
need to address the sentencing issues raised by Dowd.  
 Inasmuch as I would reverse Reilly's convictions on the 
hearsay issue, and Dowd's conviction because of the ambiguity of 
the predicate question, I would not reach the improper 
prosecutorial comment issues raised by Reilly and Dowd.  I hasten 
to add, however, that I would otherwise be in accord with the 
majority's determination that neither Reilly nor Dowd was 
prejudiced by the prosecutor's closing arguments to the jury, and 
that our holding in United States v. DiLoreto, 888 F.2d 996, 999 




 I agree that the Government could establish by 
circumstantial evidence the authenticity of most, if not all, of 
the disputed radiotelegrams transmitted to and from the Khian Sea 
during its nearly two-year odyssey.  Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(4) 
(authentication can be established by "[a]ppearance, contents, 
substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive 
characteristics, taken in conjunction with other circumstances"); 
see also United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 329 (3d Cir. 
1992) (holding that sufficient evidence existed for the jury to 
find that notes were authored by the defendant, despite the 
government's inability to establish fully the defendant's 
authorship by expert opinion), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1388 
(1993); United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49, 71 (3d Cir. 
1971) (noting that, for authentication purposes, "the connection 
between a message (either oral or written) and its source may be 
established by circumstantial evidence"), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 
936 (1972).  
 A thorough review of the record persuades me that the 
Government satisfied its burden of establishing a prima facie 
case from which the jury could have inferred that the  disputed 
radiotelegrams were what they purported to be, i.e., cable 
communications between the Khian Sea and Coastal Carriers and 
other onshore entities and individuals, including Reilly.  As we 
have often said, "'the burden of proof for authentication is 
slight.  All that is required is a foundation from which the 
fact-finder could legitimately infer that the evidence is what 
the proponent claims it to be.'"  Link v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am. 
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Inc., 788 F.2d 918, 927 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting McQueeney v. 
Wilmington Trust Co., 779 F.2d 916, 928 (3d Cir. 1985)) 
(additional citations omitted).  
 Hence, I am in accord with the majority's holding that 
the disputed radiotelegrams were properly authenticated pursuant 
to Federal Rule of Evidence 901, by circumstantial evidence.  See 
United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 661 (3d Cir. 1993) ("The 
scope of appellate review upon this issue is confined to 
determining whether the admission constituted abuse of judicial 
discretion in determining that a prima facie case had been made 
out") (internal quotes and citations omitted), cert. denied, 114 
S. Ct. 1660 (1994).  
 
A. 
   A showing of authenticity, however, "is not on a par 
with more technical evidentiary rules, such as hearsay 
exceptions, governing admissibility."  Link, 788 F.2d at 928 
(quoting United States v. Goichman, 547 F.2d 778, 784 (3d Cir. 
1976)); accord McGlory, 968 F.2d at 328-329.  That is because, 
once a prima facie showing of authenticity is made, it is the 
jury, and not the court, which ultimately determines the 
authenticity of the evidence.  Id.   
 In contrast, the determination of whether hearsay is 
admissible at all is a matter of law for the court to decide, not 
a condition of fact subject to jury resolution.  The majority's 
treatment of the hearsay issues raised by Reilly, however, 
effectively and impermissibly equates our evidentiary rules 
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governing admissibility with the slight showing required for 
authentication.   
 Contrary to the majority view, I am convinced that 13 
of the incoming radiotelegrams, while properly authenticated, 
should not have been admitted into evidence because they contain 
inadmissible hearsay.  See McGlory, 968 F.2d at 331 
("Notwithstanding authentication, the [documents] would still 
have to be excluded if the assertions in them are hearsay that 
does not fall under any exception to Federal Rule of Evidence 802 
precluding the admissibility of hearsay.").    
 
B. 
 For purposes of my analysis, I am willing to assume 
that the 18 outgoing radiotelegrams (i.e., those cable 
communications from the Khian Sea to onshore entities and 
individuals) were properly admitted by the district court.  I 
therefore accept the majority's position that the messages 
contained in those outgoing radiotelegrams were admissible 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1) as non-hearsay 
prior statements of prosecution witness Captain Fuentes, and that 
the outgoing radiotelegrams themselves were admissible under the 
Rule 803(6) hearsay exception for records of regularly conducted 
activity.  See Majority Typescript at 40-41.  I also will allow 
that the admission of the four incoming radiotelegrams not linked 
to Reilly was harmless.  See id. at 42. 
 We thus are left with 13 incoming radiotelegrams:  the 
12 purportedly sent to the Khian Sea by Reilly in Annapolis; and 
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the one purportedly sent by Kimon Berbillis, the shipping agent 
for Romo in Greece.  The transmission of each of these incoming 
radiotelegrams involved the following three-step process:  (1) a 
coastal station operator would receive a message from an onshore 
sender; (2) that operator would then note the date and time of 
the transmission and where the communication or message 
originated or was "Handed In"; and (3) the coastal station 
operator would then transmit that message in Morse Code to the 
Khian Sea, where the radioman onboard the Khian Sea would convert 
the incoming message from Morse Code into a typed message.      
 Reilly argues that the incoming radiotelegrams 
contained three levels of hearsay:  (1) the communication between 
the onshore sender (the hearsay declarant) and the coastal 
station operator (the witness auditor); (2) the communication 
between the coastal station operator (the hearsay declarant) and 
the radio operator on the Khian Sea (the witness auditor); and 
(3) the radio operator's written recordation of the message.  The 
majority concedes "that the incoming radiotelegrams to the Khian 
Sea were the product of [these] three out-of-court 'statements.'" 
Majority Typescript at 29.  It concludes, however, that those 
three out-of-court "statements" are not inadmissible hearsay. Id. 
at 30.  In reaching that conclusion, I suggest that the majority 
has put the rabbit in the hat. 
 
C. 
 The majority's hearsay analysis is fundamentally flawed 
because it is premised on the assumption that the 12 
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radiotelegrams allegedly sent by Reilly originated in Annapolis, 
where Reilly lived and worked.  See Majority Typescript at 7, 17, 
19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 26, 27, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 40.  Yet, the 
Government never adduced any evidence, apart from the disputed 
documents themselves, that the messages contained in the 
radiotelegrams had actually originated in Annapolis.  Without 
such evidence, these radiotelegrams and all statements contained 
therein cannot be linked to Reilly.   
 There was no testimony from any of the intermediate 
coastal stations that the radiotelegrams were, in fact, "Handed 
In at ANNAPOLIS," as asserted by the coastal station operators in 
the radiotelegrams.  No coastal station operator, employee, or 
representative ever testified that the originating stations, and 
the dates asserted in the radiotelegrams were, in fact, the 
originating stations from which, and the dates on which, the 
messages from the unidentified onshore declarants were received 
and/or transmitted by the coastal stations.  Moreover, even 
though the district court acknowledged that "there may be 
significant transmission errors," R. app. 1297-98, there was no 
evidence presented that the coastal stations accurately 
transcribed the messages they received from the unidentified 
onshore declarants, or that the coastal stations accurately 
transmitted those messages, in Morse Code, to the Khian Sea.    
 Hence, the "statements" contained in the radiotelegrams 
can only be viewed as "[h]earsay included within hearsay."  See 
Fed. R. Evid. 805.  We have the hearsay of unidentified onshore 
declarants transmitted by unidentified coastal operators, who 
76 
also transmitted additional hearsay specifying the point of 
origin and the date to the Khian Sea radioman, who ultimately 
translated all of that hearsay from Morse Code into a written 
recordation.  As "[h]earsay included within hearsay," the 
incoming radiotelegrams thus are subject to Rule 805, which 
requires for admissibility that "each part of the combined 
statements [must] conform[] with an exception to the hearsay rule 
provided in these rules."  The majority's "layered approach to 
the hearsay analysis," see Majority Typescript at 33 n.14, does 
not satisfy that criterion for admissibility of the incoming 
radiotelegrams.   
 Significantly, the majority fully acknowledges that the 
point of origin and destination of each radiotelegram, and the 
date on which each radiotelegram was sent, "were introduced to 
prove their truth, i.e., to prove that the radiotelegrams were 
sent from the point of origin to the destination on the 
designated date."  Majority Typescript at 32.  It further 
recognizes that the Government did not produce a coastal station 
operator as a witness, thereby complicating its hearsay analysis. 
Id. at 32 n.14.  The majority then attempts to finesse the 
absence of any testimony from the coastal stations which arguably 
could have bridged the gap in the hearsay communications between 
the unidentified onshore declarants and the radioman onboard the 
Khian Sea.  It declares, in effect, that, while it would have 
been nice for the district court to have heard from a coastal 
station operator at trial, that testimony is not really necessary 
for our purposes because we can assume, through other evidence, 
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that the radiotelegrams were "handed in at Annapolis," and 
therefore had to come from Reilly.  I disagree.   
 The majority is remitted to "assembling" evidence from 
Captain Fuentes and Coastal Carriers' secretary, Clare Dobbins, 
to substantiate its theory that Reilly authored and sent the 
radiotelegrams from Annapolis to the Khian Sea, and that Reilly 
authorized Berbillis to do the same.  The difficulty with this 
analysis is that it necessarily must rely on the dates and places 
of origin of each radiotelegram.  However, no coastal station 
operator ever testified to those essential components of the 
radiotelegrams, and thus the evidence which the majority seeks to 
weave into a hearsay exception fails, because it lacks the 
critical links that only the coastal station operators could have 
supplied.   Hence, none of the trial evidence, set forth in the 
majority's opinion, established that these 12 incoming 
radiotelegrams actually originated in Annapolis, let alone that 
Reilly sent them.  See Majority Typescript at 33 nn.14 and 15, 34 
n.16, 37 n.17, and 38 n.18.  Nor did it establish, as I point out 
later, that Reilly ever authorized Berbillis to send the 13th 
incoming radiotelegram. 
 Reilly testified at trial that anyone who knew the 
telex billing number for his Annapolis-based company, Coastal 
Carrier, could call a coastal station from anywhere in the world 
and send a shore-to-ship transmission, which would be identified 
as having originated in Annapolis.  That testimony was 
uncontroverted, and there was no evidence presented by the 
Government, apart from the radiotelegrams themselves, that it was 
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Reilly, and not someone else who knew Coastal Carriers' billing 
number, who sent the 12 incoming radiotelegrams which the 
Government attributed to Reilly.    
 Because, as I also point out later, the Government 
failed to lay the proper foundation for admission of the 
radiotelegrams pursuant to the business records exception of Rule 
803(6),0 and because the radiotelegrams themselves do not meet 
the requirements of any other exception to the hearsay rule, 
there is no admissible evidence establishing that the 12 
radiotelegrams were sent from Annapolis.  See Fed. R. Evid. 805. 
Consequently, the "statements" contained in those radiotelegrams 
-- which the majority links to Reilly through inadmissible 
hearsay (e.g., "Handed In at ANNAPOLIS") -- cannot be deemed 
admissible as non-hearsay admissions of Reilly. 
 Statements attributed to Reilly would, by themselves, 
of course, be admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(A), which provides 
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  Rule 803(6) provides: 
 
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, 
in any form, of acts, events, conditions, 
opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time 
by, or from information transmitted by, a person 
with knowledge, if kept in the course of a 
regularly conducted business activity, and if it 
was the regular practice of that business activity 
to make the memorandum, report, record, or data 
compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the 
custodian or other qualified witness, unless the 
source of information or the method of 
circumstances of preparation indicate lack of 
trustworthiness.  The term "business" as used in 
this paragraph includes business, institution, 
association, profession, occupation, and calling 
of every kind, whether or not conducted for 
profit. 
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that a statement is not hearsay if it is offered against a party, 
and is the party's own statement in either an individual or 
representative capacity.  Without the requisite foundational 
testimony from a coastal station representative, however, there 
simply is no admissible evidence establishing Reilly as the 
onshore declarant who transmitted the radiotelegram instructions 
to the Khian Sea.  That being so, any "statements" allegedly made 
in the radiotelegrams by Reilly, either directly or indirectly, 
were not admissible as non-hearsay admissions of a party-
opponent.  See Fed. R. Evid. 805; Carden v. Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp., 850 F.2d 996, 1003 (3d Cir. 1988) ("That part of [the 
hearsay included within hearsay] which contains a reiteration of 
what someone told him is not admissible as an admission by party-
opponent since the author of the statement is unknown.") 
(citation and internal quotation omitted).    
 By the same token, the message contained in the 
radiotelegram purportedly sent to the Khian Sea by Berbillis from 
Greece0 is inadmissible hearsay because no coastal station 
operator ever established Berbillis as the onshore declarant. Id.  
Nor can that out-of-court statement be deemed to be an admission 
authorized by Reilly under Rule 801(d)(2)(C).  That Rule of 
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  The radiotelegram purportedly sent on October 7, 1988 from 
Kimon Berbillis in Greece to the Khian Sea, contained the 
following  message: 
 
ATT A. FUENTES PLEASE DELAY YOUR ETA UNTIL NOON OCTOBER 
14 STOP TRY ARRIVE WITH 500 TONS IN ONEHOLD STOP REILLY 
WILL CABLE YOU INFO YOU REQUESTED STOP BEST REGARDS 




Evidence excludes from the definition of hearsay a statement 
introduced against a party which that party authorized another 
person to make concerning the subject. 
 Independent proof of the existence of an agency 
relationship and its scope would be required to show that Reilly 
authorized Berbillis to send any radiotelegram to the Khian Sea. 
See United States v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193, 200 n.4 (3d Cir. 
1992).  Contrary to the majority's position, there is no such 
proof to establish that Berbillis, an employee of Romo and not of 
Coastal Carriers, "was acting on behalf of Reilly or at his 
behest."  See Majority Typescript at 23.  The majority opinion 
nevertheless appears to assume that Reilly had authorized 
Berbillis to make the statement which appeared in the 
radiotelegram Berbillis allegedly sent to Captain Fuentes. 
However, apart from Fuentes' testimony that "Reilly told him that 
. . . Kimon Berbillis would give him [Fuentes] instructions," see 
Majority Typescript at 36, the majority points to no evidence 
establishing that Berbillis was authorized by Reilly to send any 
radiotelegram to Captain Fuentes pertaining to the ash.  Nor does 
the majority refer us to any evidence whatsoever that links 
Reilly to Romo.   
 For the same reason that no agency relationship or 
authorization appears in the proofs, the "statements" of the 
coastal operators (i.e., time, date, and place of origin of the 
radiotelegrams) and the "statements" of the Khian Sea radioman 
(i.e., the recordation of the incoming hearsay) could not be 
admitted as non-hearsay authorized admissions of Reilly pursuant 
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to Rule 801(d)(2)(C), although the majority holds otherwise.  See 
id. at 38. 
 In Carden, we cautioned district courts against 
admitting declarations of unidentified persons into evidence. 850 
F.2d at 1003.  Here, the Government failed to establish the 
identity of two groups of out-of-court declarants:  (1) the 
unidentified onshore declarants (alleged here but not proved to 
be Reilly in Annapolis and Berbillis in Greece) who transmitted 
messages to the coastal station operators; and (2) the 
unidentified coastal station operators who in turn transmitted 
those original messages in Morse Code and then added further 
hearsay allegedly establishing the place of origin and the date 
of the original message.    
 We also reiterated in Carden another well-established 
rule of law: that the proponent of evidence bears a heavy burden 
to satisfy trustworthiness requirements.  Id.  Significantly, the 
district court in the instant case recognized the "risk that the 
[onshore] sender may have been someone else other than Reilly." 
R.supp.app. 1297.  Yet, the Government never admitted any 
evidence, except for the inadmissible documents, that Reilly 
authored the statements in the radiotelegrams.  Notwithstanding 
that omission, the district court admitted the radiotelegrams 
anyway, without offering any explanation or rationale for its 
decision.  The majority compounds that error with its tortured 




 The majority also fails to support its position that 
the statements attributed to Reilly would be admissible as non-
hearsay, on the theory that those statements were not offered by 
the Government to prove that their substance was either true or 
false.  The radiotelegrams were offered more than merely "'to 
prove the fact that the certain instructions had been given,' . . 
. and as circumstantial evidence of Reilly's state of mind, 
namely his knowledge of the ash dumping operation," as the 
majority holds.  See Majority Typescript at 31.  Regardless of 
the distinctions sought to be drawn by the majority between 
instructions and statements of fact, the "instructions" here, 
even if relevant to the hearsay analysis, have extraordinary 
hearsay implications.  Compare Crawford v. Garnier, 719 F.2d 
1317, 1323 (7th Cir. 1983) (affirming district court's admission 
into evidence of nonparty's out-of-court instructions "which 
carried no hearsay implications").  
 The "instructions" attributed to Reilly -- e.g., 
"ARRIVE COLOMBO . . . WITH ONLY 500 TONS BALLAST" and "DISPOSE 
500 BALLAST PRIOR ARRIVAL SINGAPORE" -- are vastly different from 
any of the instructions or orders in the cases cited by the 
majority.  See Majority Typescript at 31 (citing Anderson v. 
United States, 417 U.S. 211, 220 n.8; Crawford, 719 F.2d at 1323; 
United States v. Gibson, 675 F.2d 825, 833-34 (6th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 972 (1982); United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 
534, 558 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 976 (1976)). 
None of the instructions in the Supreme Court case of Anderson, 
or in the courts of appeals decisions in Crawford, Gibson, and 
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Keane, carried hearsay implications, and none was admitted in the 
egregious context that these "instructions," if indeed one can 
call them that, were admitted in the instant case. 
 Of even greater import, however, is the fact that the 
messages, even if called instructions, were nevertheless made 
known to the jury and could not have helped but influence the 
jury because of their contents.  The district court never 
instructed the jury on how this evidence was to be considered; 
hence, the jury was never told that it could consider the 
messages attributed to Reilly only for the limited purpose of 
establishing that certain instructions had been given and as 
circumstantial evidence of Reilly's state of mind, and not as 
direct proof of Reilly's guilt. 
 We have many times expressed our disapproval of any 
admission of statements "which are not technically admitted for 
the truth of the matter asserted, whenever the matter asserted, 
without regard to its truth value, implies that the defendant is 
guilty of the crime charged."  McGlory, 968 F.2d at 332.  There 
is little doubt in my mind that the Government offered the 
incoming radiotelegrams to Reilly to prove, by their contents, 
that Reilly not only had ordered Captain Fuentes to dump the ash 
in the ocean, but that Reilly also lied about the ash dumping 
operation when he responded to questions at the contempt 
proceeding and again before the federal grand jury.  I do not 
believe that our cases permit the admission of such 
"circumstantial evidence" of guilt.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Reynolds, 715 F.2d 99, 103-04 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding statement 
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inadmissible because it was offered to "prove the truth of the 
assumed fact of defendant's guilt implied by its content."). 
 The evil in the majority's opinion is that it distorts 
established evidentiary jurisprudence in order to embrace the 
Government's actions, actions which are not authorized by any 
Rule of Evidence.  To accept the majority's ruling as the law of 
this court will affect not only Reilly; it will, in effect, 
dismantle the hearsay provisions of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.  Despite the attempts by the majority to cabin the 
district court's ruling within the doctrines of Anderson and 
McGlory, the majority's opinion eviscerates the very safeguards 
that the hearsay rule and its limited exceptions were designed to 
protect. 
 The messages attributed to Reilly should not, in any 
event, be considered in the hearsay calculus.  That is because 
their admissibility is not independent of the radiotelegrams 
themselves.  Whatever the messages contained in the 
radiotelegrams, the hearsay elements of the radiotelegrams which 
involved the location and date of the radiotelegrams were never 
satisfied by competent proof.  The failure of the Government to 
establish through the coastal station senders' testimony that 
Reilly was the sender from Annapolis on the particular date 
created the threshold hearsay problems, and the radiotelegrams 
"linked" to Reilly only because of the location and date shown 
could not, on this record, satisfy any exception to the hearsay 
rule.  See Fed. R. Evid. 805.  The majority's attempt to overcome 
this problem, in my view, never succeeds.  
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 The majority, without testimony that Reilly sent the 
radiotelegrams from Annapolis, seeks to gloss over this omission 
by what it calls "circumstantial evidence."  But what evidence is 
disclosed in the record?  None, because the coastal station 
operator who could have testified as to who sent the dispatchs, 
and from where and when they were sent, never testified at trial. 
 In other words, the majority would relieve the 
Government from the requirements of Rule 805, and of the 
foundational requirements of Rule 803(6), while at the same time 
it disregards our own jurisprudence.  I could not disagree more.  
E. 
 The Government argues that "[e]ven if the 
radiotelegrams were hearsay, they were properly admitted under 
the exception for records of regularly conducted activity." 
U.S.br. at 33.  Despite this argument, the majority has now 
acknowledged that, because the coastal station operators had not 
testified to lay the foundation for the introduction into 
evidence of their "statements" pursuant to the business records 
exception of the hearsay rule, "the radiotelegrams were not 
introduced as business records of the coastal sending station." 
Majority Typescript at 33 n.14.   The majority, apparently 
concerned about the admissibility of the radiotelegrams allegedly 
sent by Reilly and Berbillis, nonetheless finds support for their 
admission in the business records exception to the hearsay rule, 
Rule 803(6).  See Majority Typescript at 38-40.   
 The requirements of Rule 803(6) can be shorthanded as 
(1) knowledge, (2) contemporaneous recordation, (3) in the 
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regular course of business, (4) which requires such records 
regularly to be kept.   There can be no question that the four 
foundational requirements of Rule 803(6), identified and 
discussed by the majority ante at     (Majority Typescript at 
39), were not satisfied in the instant case. 
 Notwithstanding the testimony of the Khian Sea radio 
operator, Carcamo, about his documenting of the incoming 
radiotelegrams, those incoming radiotelegrams cannot satisfy the 
requirements of Rule 803(6) because no "qualified witness" for 
the coastal stations ever attested at trial that 
(1) the declarants in the records had knowledge to make 
accurate statements; (2) that the declarant[s] recorded 
statements contemporaneously with the actions which 
were the subject of the reports; (3) that the 
declarant[s] made the record in the regular course of 
the business activity; and (4) that such records were 
regularly kept by the business. 
 
Console, 13 F.3d at 657 (citations and internal quotations 
omitted).  Without this crucial testimony from the coastal 
station operators, who were the intermediaries in the 
transmissions between the onshore declarants and Carcamo, the 
incoming radiotelegrams could not be admitted in evidence. 
 I therefore suggest that the majority's reliance on 
Carcamo's testimony, see Majority Transcript at 40-41, is clearly 
misplaced.  As I point out below, Carcamo was in no position to 
testify as to who the declarants were, the origin of the 
radiotelegrams, or the date they were transmitted by the onshore 
declarants.  The fact that Carcamo may have kept files of these 
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messages cannot supply the foundational requirements that only 
the coastal station operators could have furnished.  
 Rule 803(6) requires each person transmitting recorded 
information to "verify the information provided, or [else] the 
information transmitted [must meet] the requirements of another 
hearsay exception, Fed.R.Evid. 805."  Console, 13 F.3d at 657.  
No coastal station operator ever verified the "statements" 
contained in the radiotelegrams, and those "statements" 
ultimately recorded by Carcamo onboard the Khian Sea were 
inadmissible because they do not satisfy the requirements of any 
other exception to the hearsay rule.  See Fed. R. Evid. 805.   
 The principal precondition to admission of documents as 
business records is that the records have sufficient indicia of 
trustworthiness to be considered reliable.  Fed. R. Evid. 803(6) 
(authorizing admission of records of regularly conducted 
activities "unless the source of information or the method or 
circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.") 
(emphasis added).   Here, the record reveals that the 
precondition of trustworthiness was not satisfied.  The only 
evidence even remotely bearing on this issue was Carcamo's 
testimony that he never had any complaints about the accuracy of 
his translation of Morse Code.  Carcamo did not, and could not, 
testify about the accuracy of the coastal station operators' 
translation of the original message into Morse Code and their 
transmissions of those coded messages to the Khian Sea, let alone 
concerning "the source of information," as required by Rule 
803(6).   
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 Indeed, the district court explicitly recognized that 
"there may be significant transmission errors in particular 
documents," R. supp. app. 1297-28, and the Government never 
presented any evidence from the coastal station operators to 
quell that concern.  For this reason alone, the incoming 
radiotelegrams themselves could not be admitted under the 
business records exception to the hearsay rule.  See United 
States v. Nixon, 779 F.2d 126, 134 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that 
telex containing many inaccuracies failed to satisfy requirements 
of Rule 803(6)).   
 
F. 
  For all of the reasons which I have discussed -- i.e., 
no proof that the radiotelegrams were sent by or authorized by 
Reilly, and no foundation for their admission under any exception 
to the hearsay rule, including the business records exception --I 
would hold that the 12 incoming radiotelegrams purportedly sent 
to the Khian Sea by Reilly from Annapolis, the one radiotelegram 
purportedly sent by Berbillis from Greece, and all statements 
contained therein, were erroneously admitted into evidence by the 
district court.   
 There is no question in my mind that the erroneous 
admission of the 13 radiotelegrams was not harmless error.  That 
evidence was crucial to the Government's case against Reilly.  It 
alone corroborated Captain Fuentes' testimony that Reilly ordered 
the Khian Sea crew to dump the ash in the ocean, and that Reilly 
thus knew that the ash had been dumped in the ocean.  Indeed, the 
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Government indicated to the jury that the radiotelegrams, and not 
the testimony of Captain Fuentes, was "the" evidence against 
Reilly.  R.app. 1109.0 
 Because those 13 incoming radiotelegrams were 
enormously prejudicial to Reilly, I would hold that it was 
reversible error for the district court to admit them into 
evidence.  Accordingly, I would reverse Reilly's convictions on 
all charges, and I would remand his case to the district court 
for a new trial.   
 
III. 
 I also believe that the majority errs in holding that 
the predicate question forming the basis for Dowd's conviction 
for knowingly making a false declaration before the federal grand 
jury was not fatally ambiguous.  Rather, I am convinced that a 
reversal and a remand for dismissal of the false declaration 
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  In his summation to the jury, the prosecutor urged: "Ladies 
and gentlemen, look at the cables, this is the evidence." R.app. 
1109.  The prosecutor further argued that: 
 
Captain Fuentes is not the key witness in this 
case.  All of the evidence is what I am asking and 
I submit to you what you need to consider . . . . 
Not anyone, not anyone could have filled those 
cables out.  When you read them, read through them 
and see how they fit together very well.  See how 
they show what was going on at the time. 
 
R.app. 1117-18.  While acknowledging that the Government bore the 
burden of proof at trial, the prosecutor also told the jury that, 
"I guarantee you one thing, if [Reilly] had anything to say that 
would have discredited those cables, [he] would have brought 
them. . . . [Reilly] didn't bring them because the cables are 
accurate."  R.app. 1122.   
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charge against Dowd is required because the question which he is 
alleged to have answered falsely is so fundamentally ambiguous 
that it would be entirely unreasonable to expect that he 
understood it.  United States v. Ryan, 828 F.2d 1010, 1015 (3d 
Cir. 1987); United States v. Slawik, 548 F.2d 75, 86 (3d Cir. 
1977). 
 Before the federal grand jury, the following exchange 
took place: 
A GRAND JUROR: Do you know what happened to the ash? 
[DOWD]:  No. 
A GRAND JUROR: You have no idea? 
 [DOWD]:  No, I don't.  I honestly have not been 
on that ship for two and a half years. * 
* *  
A GRAND JUROR: Seeing how you had all this concern of 
not being able to unload this ash, you 
didn't ask anybody where it went: 
[DOWD]:  Who is there to ask? 
A GRAND JUROR: I guess you could start with asking the 
captain.  He ought to know where it 
went. 
[DOWD]:  They say -- he's a funny guy.  The first 
time I met him.  Honduran person.  He 
said "The ash is gone."  And I said --  
A GRAND JUROR: Just said good, but you didn't ask where 
it went?  You didn't want to know where 
it went? 
[DOWD]:  No, I didn't ask and I don't know.   All 
right?  Nor did he tell me.   
 
(D. app. 475-76 (emphasis added.)   
 
    At trial, the jury was asked to answer special 
interrogatories with respect to the above-quoted testimony. 
Specifically, it was asked to decide the truth or falsity of 
Dowd's negative responses to each of the following distinct 
questions:   
 (1) "Do you know what happened to the ash?"  
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(2) "You have no idea?"  
(3) "[Y]ou didn't ask where it went?  You didn't want 
to know where it went?"   
 The jury acquitted Dowd of giving false testimony in 
response to question (3); that is, the jury found that Dowd did 
not ask where the ash went and did not want to know where the ash 
went.  The jury did not return a verdict on question (1); thus it 
never decided whether Dowd answered falsely when he testified 
before the grand jury that he did not know what happened to the 
ash.  With respect to question (2), the jury found that Dowd 
violated 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a) by falsely stating, "No, I don't," 
in response to the question, "You have no idea?" 
 While I agree with the majority that a jury is 
"generally free to determine the meaning the defendant ascribed 
to a question," I cannot agree with the majority's conclusion 
that the question "You have no idea?" is amenable to jury 
interpretation.  See Majority Typescript at 50.   The Government 
concedes that "if viewed in isolation, that question would be 
fatally ambiguous."  U.S. br. at 50.  Unlike the majority, 
however, I am not persuaded by the Government's argument that the 
ambiguity issue can be resolved in its favor and against Dowd 
because "'viewed in context, the question posed to Dowd was 'you 
have no idea [what happened to the ash]?'"  See Majority 
Typescript at 49 (quoting U.S. br. at 51).   
 In my opinion, the question "You have no idea?" not 
only is imprecise and vague, it is susceptible to at least two 
possible meanings.  That much is evident by the equally plausible 
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constructions urged by Dowd and by the Government.  As the 
Government argues, the question could be viewed as asking Dowd, 
"Are you certain that you have no knowledge of what happened to 
the ash?"  Or, as Dowd contends, the question can be viewed as 
asking whether Dowd had "any idea -- however far it may fall 
short of actual knowledge -- concerning what happened to the 
ash?"  D. rp.br. at 3-4.   
 It is impossible to say that "'men of ordinary 
intellect could agree'" about the meaning of the question, "You 
have no idea?"  See Ryan, 828 F.2d at 1015, 1017 (citations 
omitted).  That question can just as easily be understood to be 
asking whether Dowd had any actual knowledge of what happened to 
the ash, as it could be understood as asking Dowd whether he had 
any idea whatsoever about what happened to the ash, as Dowd 
contends.  
 Although the majority indicates otherwise, see majority 
typescript at 49, the district court never rejected Dowd's 
argument that the question, "You have no idea?" was fatally 
ambiguous.0  To the contrary, in granting Dowd a stay of sentence 
                     
0
 Before trial, the district court rejected Dowd's motion to 
dismiss the false declaration count on the ground that it was 
based on questions and answers too ambiguous or vague so as to be 
legally insufficient to support a perjury conviction.  In doing 
so, the district court focused only on two of the three questions 
later submitted to the jury:  "Do you know what happened to the 
ash?" and "[Y]ou didn't ask where it went?  You didn't want to 
know where it went?"  United States v. Reilly, 811 F. Supp. 177, 
180 (D. Del. 1993).  The district court never even considered the 
ambiguity of the question "You have no idea?" -- the only 




pending appeal, the district court recognized that "there is a 
substantial question about the ambiguity and the materiality of 
the question and answer that was the subject of the perjury 
conviction." R. app. 302.  I, too, believe that there is a 
substantial question about the ambiguity and materiality of the 
predicate question, and I would hold that that question must be 
resolved in favor of Dowd.  See Ryan, 828 F.2d at 1015; Slawik, 
548 F.2d at 86.  I do not address materiality because the patent 
ambiguity of the question to which Dowd responded obviates any 
need to go beyond the issue of ambiguousness.  Slawik, 548 F.2d 
at 86. 
 Because of the inherent ambiguity of the question "You 
have no idea," I do not believe that the jury should have been 
allowed to consider Dowd's answer to that question as a possible 
basis for conviction of the false swearing charge.  See Ryan, 828 
F.2d at 1017.  Accordingly, I would reverse Dowd's conviction for 
knowingly answering that question falsely before the grand jury, 
and I would not even reach the issue Dowd raises concerning the 
materiality of that question. 
IV. 
 I again emphasize my concern that the majority's 
unfortunate "hearsay" analysis, which results in sustaining 
Reilly's conviction, will have ramifications that will extend far 
beyond the confines of this appeal, so long as it remains the law 
of this circuit.   
 For the reasons which I have expressed in the foregoing 
opinion, I respectfully dissent from the majority's affirmance of 
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the judgments of conviction and sentence against both Reilly and 
Dowd. 
